

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

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Form Number AR 111 is to be used

SUBJECT: EXERCISE CLOSE ENCOUNTER

[illegible][illegible]

ARCHIVAL ACTION

close 2/10/07

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE FILING OF CORRESPONDENCE AND THE HANDLING OF FILES ARE CONTAINED IN DEPARTMENTAL AND SINGLE SERVICE MANUALS

[illegible]

FILE
NO

17

26

AIR

Part
1

TITLE

EXERCISE CLOSE ENCOUNTER

~~RESTRICTED~~

Referred To

Date

Referred To

Date

Referred To

Date

~~XO~~~~4 JUN 81~~~~STAND~~~~26 JUN 81~~~~XO~~~~7 JUL 81~~~~1 JUL 81~~~~10 JUL 81~~

[illegible]

38
36

From	20cu	File	2/3/Air P43(3)	Date	1 Aug 83	References	A. HQOC SIGEM 018/COFS OF 25 JUL 83 B. 20cu/2/3/Air(1) of 20 Jul 83
To	HQWLM		Attention		STANDO		
For Information							
Subject	OPERATION CHOSE ENCOUNTER						



1. Reference A requested details of equipment/manpower resources committed and manpower overtime hours accrued during Operation Chose Encounter. Reference B advised overtime hours accrued.

2. During the exercise, the following shifts were worked by aircrew:

a. 1 Jul 83 0500 - 1500 6 pilots + 1 desk officer (3 hrs overtime)

b. 1/2 Jul 83 1500 - 0100 1 pilot for 3 hrs (77 SQN remainder),

c. 2 Jul 83 0100 - 1000 6 pilots + 1 desk O, and

d. 2/3 Jul 83 1600 - 0200 " " .

3. Ground crew worked similar shifts with an additional shift on Sunday and 0500 start on Sunday. Each shift consisted of 1 x Engo and 12 airmen.

4. During each shift, two aircraft were on alert with two more aircraft on standby to relieve at shift changeover.

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No.
<i>R.B. Adam</i>	R.B. ADAM	FRNT	ADMINO	6725

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

Write or Print Clearly

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From	3COW	File	87/59/AIR(32)	Date	28 JULY 83	References:	A. HQOC COMI 018/COFS of 250640Z JUL 83
To	Helmcom	Attention	STANDO				
For Information							
Subject	OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS						

1. Please find attached an account of 3COW's decisive efforts in the recent VTO hunt, commonly known as "Operation Close Encounters".

17/26/83
(M)
2. This report was originally raised at Unit level in the belief that someone, somewhere, someday would ask for it. Thus, although it is not in direct response to your request as a result of Reference A, it should contain the information sought among a host of other exciting revelations.

3. Perhaps the only additional information necessary is that each shift involved about twenty persons, all ranks. Naturally the entire hardware and software resources of 3COW were devoted to the task.

Enclosure: 3COW/83/59/AIR() OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS

Signature	K. A. Keenan	Name	K. A. KEENAN	Rank	SENIOR	Appointment	XO	Phone No.	6158
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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	FOR		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NEA
	ACT	INF					
HQWLM	☒		REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)	OC	☒		
BSWLM				ADMINSO	☒		
4815QN				XO	☒		
775QN			REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE	OPSO			
20 CU				STANDO			
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO HQWLM BY <i>XO</i>	INTELO			
265QN				ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: <i>PD</i> <i>Other inputs?</i> <i>MM</i>							

3F on file



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3 CRU/83/59/AIR(30)

OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTER'

Reference: A. HQOC 073/SOINT SIG EAI of 300350ZJUN83

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference A reported a series of unidentified radar contacts at the Area Approach Control Centre (AACC) Mascot, stating, inter alia, that their movement was consistent with that of aircraft and that technicians at the AACC had indicated they could only have been caused by man-made objects.

2. These sightings had allegedly taken place over several weeks, one having apparently been corroborated by an operator at 3CRU.

3. As a result of this message RAAF Base Williamtown was directed at about 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to mount an investigation. At 0600 hours on Friday 1 July 1983, therefore, 2 Mirage interceptors were placed on Alert 2 under the tactical control of 3CRU which simultaneously started round the clock surveillance in an attempt to correlate any findings with Mascot. Operation 'Close Encounter' was begun.

AIM

4. This report is tendered to record the subsequent investigation into the alleged unidentified flying objects (UFO) by 3CRU.

INVESTIGATION

Initial Reports

5. As the surveillance team was set up the initial report at Reference A was examined. Unfortunately the information presented was vague but it was established that 3CRU was never operating at the time of any incident listed. Air Defence personnel were questioned whether they had seen any similar phenomena but nothing positive was found.

6. XO 3CRU held telephone conversations with two successive Senior Area Controllers (SAC) at DOA, Mascot to investigate movement patterns. Relying on memory alone these gentlemen were of the opinion that contacts had appeared mostly north or south of Sydney, travelling mostly north or north-east. Radial interference or 'marching men' was initially suspected by 3CRU officers but DOA reported that some slight alterations in heading had been observed which is not typical of this type of interference.

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7. A careful watch was set up and contact established with Sector 8 (RAAF ATC) Mascot which was requested to report any further contacts. Several were reported on the first day but were fleetingly held by Sydney with nothing at all seen by either 3CRU or WLM SURAD. These contacts were again well to the north of Sydney and 3CRU should have been in a more favourable position to pick them up. As the RSR has no height finder nothing could be determined in the vertical plane except that the alleged speeds suggested high altitude. Tactics for provisional intercepts were designed accordingly, being essentially a supersonic acceleration at best acceleration altitude, followed by a climbing approach. 'Clean' aircraft were made available for maximum operational effectiveness and authority to use the full performance of the aircraft regardless of location was given.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

8. Notwithstanding the number of contacts emanating from the 23 cm wavelength RSR, orders were passed that no scramble would occur unless contact was held on the 3CRU (10 cm) radar, with control carried out by a qualified officer. Thus no aircraft were launched on the first day.

9. A further analysis of sightings was made on the evening of 1 July 1983, using evidence from a survey of AACC tapes going as far back as possible. From this it appeared that no sightings had occurred between 1000 hours and 1600 hours (local) over several weeks. Aircraft were released between these hours on 2 July 1983.

10. As the operation progressed, however, it became clear that no such clear-cut chronological pattern existed. Nevertheless most contacts persisted in a narrow sector of about 30° between 70 and 150 n miles north of Sydney, heading between 020° and 050° at speeds estimated between 600 and 3600 knots. Some 'painted' for no more than a few sweeps of the RSR. No sonic booms were reported at these times and no correlating returns were held by 3CRU or SURAD, although brief excitement was generated by an occasional descending meteorological balloon.

11. The standard of reporting by AACC personnel continued to be vague and incomplete and there was no ready explanation of why contacts were being reported well within the Round Mountain Unattended Radar (RMUA) coverage. A team of 3 Air Defence Controllers was therefore despatched to the AACC at PM hours on 2 July 1983 to begin continuous operation at Sector 7. This team consisted of SQNLDR B. Niblett, CC 3CRU, graduate of the GDEW course, FLTLT J. Gardon, ADCI 3CRU, a former RADTECH, AND FLGOFF S. Snow, 114CRU, who had completed the Identification Officer's Course.

12. These officers were briefed to undertake three tasks, viz:

- a. To plot as accurately as possible every contact, calculating a precise heading and speed and examining general characteristics,

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- b. To control interceptors against these contacts if a reasonable chance of interception presented itself, and
- c. To seek a technical explanation of why these contacts were not seen at all by the RMUA.

Investigations at Mascot AACC

13. FLGOFF Snow, being first to arrive, began operations at 1430 hours on 2 July 1983. Upon plotting one or two contacts sweep by sweep he was able to report a slight clockwise spiral movement. This was consistent with a type of radar interference colloquially known as 'running rabbits' and immediately explained why all previously reported alterations of course had been minor and to the right.

14. Follow up action by the remainder of the team from about 1630 hours consisted of:

- a. checking the background of what had been reported by AACC staff,
- b. establishing whether or not the RMUA had generated any of the contacts,
- c. requesting assistance to conduct a technical investigation into the performance of the RSR by implementing suitable test procedures, and
- d. the implementation of such test procedures and analysis of results.

15. In the first instance it became apparent that none of the technical staff would admit to the statement that the objects observed were likely to be man-made, a key element in Reference A, and, in the second instance, technical staff were adamant that no contacts had been generated by the RMUA, on which the presentation of tracks is computer-initiated and transmitted by data link to Mascot. Overlap by the Sydney RSR, however, does occur into the RMUA area up to 165 n miles from Sydney.

16. In the third instance, CC 3CRU asked whether any comparison had been carried out between the AACC Operators' presentation and the technical maintenance radarscope in the workshop across the corridor from the AACC at the time of the sightings. This rather elementary test had not been done, although the phenomena had been noticed since early June.

17. Further enquiries revealed that a test picture could be taken from several stages in the receiver chain of the RSR and a test procedure was set up accordingly. When the picture generated by the radar processor was examined in conjunction with an AACC sighting, definite solid bars of interference occurred on the same radial. By the time this information was further refined within the radar, however, it was obviously presented to the operator in the AACC as a rapidly moving, aircraft-like contact.

18. A picture was then drawn from a position as close

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to the waveguide inlets for both receivers as possible. This meant that virtually 'raw' video would be observed on the maintenance 'scope'. While this would also present weather returns, ground clutter, etc, any solid object in the radar beam capable of returning an echo would be seen at that stage. At the time when the customary phenomena were being observed in the AACC, no moving airborne objects appeared in the corresponding position as raw video. These tests proved beyond reasonable doubt that the unidentified objects reported by Sydney were generated entirely by radar interference affecting the RSR.

19. The first opportunity to discuss the matter with senior technical staff at DOA occurred on Monday 4 July 1983. At a suitably arranged conference agreement was reached that the radar contacts in question were not man-made. A cautiously worded press statement was released as a result in a manner that would not embarrass departmental personnel. 3CRU was stood down from the operation at 1620 hours that day.

COSTS OF OPERATION

20. The events controlled by 3CRU were held to as low a key as possible commensurate with the efficient running of the operation. The unit was placed in two twelve-hour shifts with minimum maintenance staff to cover the various major equipments and sufficient operational personnel to ensure that an alert surveillance/tracking/intercept team was on watch at all times. Some extra equipment and administrative effort was also required.

21. Even so 66½ man days of overtime was accrued by enlisted members, being 37½ to maintenance, 6 for administration/equipment support and 23 to operations. Officers were rostered for a considerable number of extra duties and some attended voluntarily.

22. Service transport and accommodation was used for the detachment to Mascot AACC. This involved about 1000 km travelled by staff car and nine man days of incidental allowances and out of pocket meal claims as member were largely absent from Service messes at standard meal times. One C130 may have been diverted to Sydney Airport to deliver FLGOFF Snow on the Saturday.

23. Planned maintenance at 3CRU was disrupted and fell behind by 3 days and No 6 Air Defence Identification Officer's Course started a day late because students and instructors were required to stand-to during the operation, and No 6 Myriad Maintenance Programmer's Course was delayed by 3 days through lack of access to equipment.

RESPONSE BY 3CRU MEMBERS

24. The response by 3CRU members throughout was exemplary. Although nothing was sighted and the incoming reports given little credence from the earliest stages, all Operations Flight personnel applied themselves to the task

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with the utmost seriousness and concentration, to the extent that individual COMPOPs were reluctant to break for meals in case the software became unserviceable in their absence.

26. The radar, software and support systems operated without a break throughout the entire period, which reflects credit upon unit technicians. Moreover the radar picture remained at all times of high quality, engendering confidence in its use.

26. The greatest praise is reserved for the AACC investigatory team. These officers at very short notice undertook an open-ended attachment involving long hours of travel and duty and irregular meals. In swift order they established the facts and set up definitive tests to display wherein the fault lay. In dealing with civilians in an awkward situation a considerable amount of tact had to be displayed, realizing the strong union influence within the DOA organization.

CONCLUSIONS

27. The UFO sightings at AACC Mascot, having occurred over a period of several weeks before becoming the subject of a highly charged message, elicited puzzlement rather than belief among ADGE personnel. Their pattern and speeds were inconsistent and irrational and nothing had been reported by any other agency.

28. On the spot investigations by suitably qualified Air Defence Controllers quickly resulted in a convincingly negative report. The methods used in these investigations were reasonably elementary and could have been instigated between AACC operational and technical staff in the preceeding weeks. The lines of communication, extending as they did across the width of an entire corridor, seem to have been insufficient for the purpose.

29. 3CRU staff responded willingly and cheerfully, working continuously in 12 hour shifts or remaining on standby at home without being ordered. Enlisted members accrued overtime was high, maintenance and training fell behind, and some incidental costs were incurred.

RECOMMENDATIONS

30. Phenomena such as initiated this operation should be thoroughly analysed as soon as they occur, using such methods as:

- a. comparison between various sensors covering the same area,
- b. accurate plotting and evaluation of the movements of the observed objects,
- c. seeking advice and assistance from better qualified or more experienced personnel

when available, and

- d. conducting a thorough internal investigation of electronic equipment by setting suitable test procedures in train and analysing results, and
- e. investigating any source of practical jokes.

31. An alert over an entire air defence sector should be a last step in the investigatory chain, not the first.

32. The importance of data-linking the various radar sensors in an air defence sector is highlighted. Work has begun on this and should be allocated a high priority.

33. Finally the importance of an up to date recall plan is emphasized. In this 3CRU is well served by computer print-out.



(K.A. KEENAN)
SQNLDR
XO 3CRU

14 Jul 83

- ANNEXES:
- A. Record and Plot of UFO contacts by AACC Sydney from 302035Z JUN 83 to 012359Z JUL 83
 - B. Record and Plot from 020001Z to 022359Z JUL 83
 - C. Record and Plot from 030001Z to 032359Z JUL 83
 - D. Chronological record of UFO contacts throughout Operation Close Encounters

UFO REPORTS BY AACC SYDNEY FROM
302035 JUN 83 TO 012359 JUL 83
(m)

TIME	REPORTED BY	BRG/RANGE	HDG	SPEED	REMARKS
302035	SYD	(005SYD125) 355WLM50	050	FAST(1)	Held 12 Seconds. Not seen by 3CRU
010322	SYD	275SYD105	NW	FAST	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU
0340	SYD	340SYD130	?	?	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU
0515	SYD	(079SYD127) 115WLM120	070	SLOW	Classified Met Balloon. Held by 3CRU. Faded 120/135 on desc From FL240.
0605	SYD	335SYD135	030	FAST	Held 2 sweeps. Not held by 3CRU.
0733	SYD	005SYD155	030	FAST	2 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.
0742	SYD	005SYD72	030	FAST	3 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.
0936	SYD	(019SYD78) 090WLM10	?	?	Query by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU
1028	SYD	(357SYD87) 300WLM25	020	M1.2	60 seconds. Not seen by 3CRU.
1120	SYD	050SYD120	?	?	Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.
1121	SYD	050SYD135	?	?	Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.
1446	SYD	(005SYD138) 355WLM65	030	FAST	Report as faster than normal jet traffic. Held for 20 Nmiles by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.
2018	SYD	010SYD98	020	FAST	Held briefly. Nothing seen by 3CRU
2214	SYD	360SYD110	N	FAST	Faded 350SYD120 after 15 secs held by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.
2216	SYD	360SYD138	N	V.FAST	Probably reappearance of 2214 track. Nothing seen by 3CRU
216:20	SYD	003SYD145	N	V.FAST	
216:30	SYD	003SYD158	N	V.FAST	
2221	SYD	012SYD165	?	?	One sweep. Not seen by 3CRU
2325	SYD	003SYD153	020	FAST	Track appeared to turn onto 030 at 005SYD163 and faded at 005SYD165. Held by SYD less than 2 mins. Not seen by 3CRU.

Notes:

1. Fast indicates not below 600 knots. Some speeds appear well in excess of 1000 knots.

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ANNEX B TO
3CRU/83/59/AIR
DATED 14 JULY 1983

UFO REPORTS SIGHTED BY AACC SYDNEY
FROM 020001Z - 022359Z JUL 83

TIME (Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPEED	HT	REMARKS
0230	SECTOR 8	005/100	N	FAST	-	Held briefly by SYD. Not seen by 3CRU.
0320	SECTOR 8	336/124	N	400	-	Held briefly by SYD. Not seen by 3CRU.
0437	SECTOR 7	360/120	020	750	-	16 sweeps at sector 7: when plotted by 3CRU on paper, HDG, and SPD works out at 040 1050 knots (± 200). Not seen by 3CRU.
0437½	SECTOR 7	005/135				
0439	SECTOR 7	008/150				
0608	SECTOR 7	005/137	025	700	-	13 sweeps at sect 7. Not seen by 3CRU
0609	SECTOR 7	008/158				
0630	SECTOR 7	003/90	010	600+	-	3 good paints. Not seen 3CRU
0636	SECTOR 7	005/112	010	600+	-	1 paint only. (possibly related to previous contact)
1803	SECTOR 7	004/154	060	-	-	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU.
2240	SECTOR 7	357/87	170	900	-	Held as firm contact by SYD for 20+ Nmiles. Not seen by 3CRU or WLM SURAD
2241	SECTOR 7	355/62				

UFO REPORTS BY AACC SYDNEY FROM
030001Z JUL 83 - 032359Z JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPEED	HT	REMARKS
0321	SYD	330/140	120	600	EST HIGH	Contact for 6 sweeps (approx 12 miles)
0643	SYD	350/135	170	-	-	No SPD/HT given.
0703	SYD	352/148	170	-	-	No SPD/HT given. 3 sweeps only.
0953	SYD	356/125	S	400	-	Believed by SYD to be interference, heavy weather in area. Not seen by 3CRU.
0953	WLM APP	011/112 (340WLM40)	170	M1.5 to M2	-	Held briefly by WLM SUR. D. Plots about 15 Nmiles SE of SYD contact at same time. Heavy WX. 3 paints only. Not seen by 3CRU.
1000	3CRU	352/102 (310WLM40)	180	400	-	Classified aircraft which flew on to SYD. Lines up with SYD 0953 report.
1411	SYD	010/115	S	-	-	Held until faded over WLM at 1425. Not seen by 3CRU. Heavy weather in area.
2310	SYD	010/140	180	-	-	Held 2 - 3 sweeps by SYD. Not seen by 3CRU. Not seen SURAD.

Note:

'Cease Tell' occurred from 2310 at start of conference with DOA technicians at Mascot.

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OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY

0001 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2359 7

(REPORTED)
PREVIOUS SIGHTINGS

30 JUN 83

01 JUL 83

02 JUL 83

03 JUL 83

1000 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1000 LOCAL

ANNEX D TO
3CRU/83/59/AIR
DATED 14 JULY 1983

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NNNNV ZCOHA000

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RR RAYRWB

83 JUL 25 11 20

DE RAYROB 022 2064638

ZNY RRRRR

R 250640Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG EMI

018/COFS

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. HQOC 387/COFS OF 01JUL83

1. THE REFERENCE DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS OF HQWLM AND HQAMB PARTICIPATE IN INVESTIGATION OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR.

2. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE FULL DETAILS OF EQUIPMENT/MANPOWER RESOURCES COMMITTED AND THE MANPOWER OVERTIME HOURS ACCRUED IN MEETING THIS TASK

BT



	FOR		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
	ACT	INF					
HQWLM	☒	☐	REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)	OC	☒	☐	☐
BSWLM	☐	☐		ADMINSO	☐	☐	☐
4815QN	☐	☐		XO	☒	☐	☐
77SQN	☐	☐	REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE	OPSO	☐	☐	☐
20 CU	☐	☐		STANDO	☐	☐	☐
4 FLT	☐	☐		BFSO	☐	☐	☐
ICRU	☐	☐	REPLY TO HQWLM BY	INTELO	☐	☐	☐
65QN	☐	☐		ORWOFF	☐	☐	☐
AJWE	☐	☐		WOD	☐	☐	☐
66GL	☐	☐			☐	☐	☐
PTS	☐	☐			☐	☐	☐
SAR	☐	☐			☐	☐	☐

XO R
PD. I had asked blmts
to report. MMM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
 T ELEMENTS OF HQWLM AND HQAMB

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Handwritten notes:
XO H
PD. I had asked Wm to report. Mmm

Handwritten note: E-mail file

Handwritten note: 17/26/83 (M)

Handwritten note: Reply has been sent this is probably second copy of action signal.

Handwritten signature: KH.

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NNNN

A 273
Revised Aug 79
Stock No. 7530-66-052-8064
MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Write or Print Clearly

From	BSWLM	File	17/2/AIR (16)	Date	28 JUL 83	References	A. HAZ EMI 018/COFS of 25 JUL 83
To	HQWLM	Attention	STANDO				
For Information							
Subject	OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER						

THE FOLLOWING BSWLM DETAILS ARE PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO
REF A :

SECTION	EQUIPMENT/MANPOWER	HOURS ACCRUED
---------	--------------------	---------------

ATC	MANPOWER	208
-----	----------	-----

TELECOMMUNICATIONS	MANPOWER - RADTELHG	196
	- COMMSOP	116

EQUIPMENT	MANPOWER (WAREHOUSE AND FUEL FARM)	124
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TRANSPORT	MANPOWER	80
	EQUIPMENT (SWEEPER)	16

CATERING	MANPOWER	350
	EQUIPMENT - MEALS CONSUMED	105

MEDICAL	MANPOWER - NURS	130
	MO	130

TOTAL BSWLM MANHOURS ACCRUED 1334

Signature	Name	Rank	Appointment	Phone No.
	B. VITNELL	FLT LT	ADMINI	6171

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

	FOR		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT INF NFA		
	ACT	INF			ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM	✓		REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO		✓	
481SQN				XO			
77SQN			REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO	✓		
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
265SQN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
56GL							
PTS							
SAR							

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Actioned by
STANDO on
28 Jul 83

Olweh

WEDICUT

EQUIPMENT - WEAPNS COMBINED 102

WATERBURY

WATERBURY

320

EQUIPMENT (2 WEAPNS)

11

WATERBURY

WATERBURY

80

EQUIPMENT

WATERBURY (MUNICIPALITY AND LOCAL GOVT)

154

COMBINED

119

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

WATERBURY - HYDROGRAPHIC

109

WTC

WATERBURY

308

SECTION

EQUIPMENT / WATERBURY

WORKS WORKED

THE FOLLOWING BSMW DELIVER, WAS PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO

OBSERVATION CODE ENCOUNTERED

HQMFW		214000	
BSMFW		1215/100 (10)	
MUNICIPALITY		WATERBURY	

MUNICIPALITY

RESTRICTED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION



LINE 1	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS RESTRICTED
LINE 2	
LINE 3	
LINE 4	83 JUL 28 - 5 21
LINE 5	

PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP 230515Z JUL 83	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS TABULATE																																													
ROUTINE INDICATORS	NOTE: Write only one addressee per line		SIG/ORIG NO																																													
	FROM HQWL7		EMI																																													
	TO HGOC																																															
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER			OTS / X0																																													
A EMI 018/COFS OF 250640Z JUL 83			GR																																													
1 IN RESPONSE TO REF A THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED																																																
A BSWLM																																																
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LINE 3																							
LINE 4																							
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ROUTINE INDICATORS				NOTE: Write only one addressee per line												SIG/ORIG NO							
				FROM																			
				TO																			
				EQUIPMENT 3x MIR 3 ON ALERT NIL FLYING																			
				TOTAL FOR UNIT 756 HRS																			
C				77 SQN												208 HRS							
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Stock No 7530-66-094-6819

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33

STANDO

Ken, this is not yet properly typed but I think it contains all you need.

Reference: A. HQOC 073/SOINT SIG EAI of 300350ZJUN83

You may also wish to know that each shift used about 20 people, all ranks.

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference A reported a series of unidentified radar contacts at the Area Approach Control Centre (AACC) Mascot, stating, inter alia, that their movement was consistent with that of aircraft and that technicians at the AACC had indicated they could only have been caused by man-made objects. *McLean to 3CRU*

2. These sightings had allegedly taken place over several weeks, one having apparently been corroborated by an operator at 3CRU.

3. As a result of this message RAAF Bae Williamtown was directed at about 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to mount an investigation. At 0600 hours on Friday 1 July 1983, therefore, 2 Mirage interceptors were placed on Alert 2 under the tactical control of 3CRU which simultaneously started round the clock surveillance in an attempt to correlate any findings with Mascot. Operation 'Close Encounter' was begun.

AIM

4. This report is tendered to record the subsequent investigation into the alleged unidentified flying objects (UFO) by 3CRU.

INVESTIGATION

Initial Reports

5. As the surveillance team was set up the initial report at Reference A was examined. Unfortunately the information presented was vague but it was established that 3CRU was never operating at the time of any incident listed. Air Defence personnel were questioned whether they had seen any similar phenomena but nothing positive was found.

6. XO 3CRU held telephone conversations with two successive Senior Area Controllers (SAC) at DOA, Mascot to investigate movement patterns. Relying on memory alone these gentlemen were of the opinion that contacts had appeared mostly north or south of Sydney, travelling mostly north or north-east. Radial interference or 'marching men' was initially suspected by 3CRU officers but DOA reported that some slight alterations in heading had been observed which is not typical of this type of interference.

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7. A careful watch was set up and contact established with Sector 8 (RAAF ATC) Mascot which was requested to report any further contacts. Several were reported on the first day but were fleetingly held by Sydney with nothing at all seen by either 3CRU or WLM SURAD. These contacts were again well to the north of Sydney and 3CRU should have been in a more favourable position to pick them up. As the RSR has no height finder nothing could be determined in the vertical plane except that the alleged speeds suggested high altitude. Tactics for provisional intercepts were designed accordingly, being essentially a supersonic acceleration at best acceleration altitude, followed by a climbing approach. 'Clean' aircraft were made available for maximum operational effectiveness and authority to use the full performance of the aircraft regardless of location was given.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

8. Notwithstanding the number of contacts emanating from the 23 cm wavelength RSR, orders were passed that no scramble would occur unless contact was held on the 3CRU (10 cm) radar, with control carried out by a qualified officer. Thus no aircraft were launched on the first day.

9. A further analysis of sightings was made on the evening of 1 July 1983, using evidence from a survey of AACC tapes going as far back as possible. From this it appeared that no sightings had occurred between 1000 hours and 1600 hours (local) over several weeks. Aircraft were released between these hours on 2 July 1983.

10. As the operation progressed, however, it became clear that no such clear-cut chronological pattern existed. Nevertheless most contacts persisted in a narrow sector of about 30° between 70 and 150 n miles north of Sydney, heading between 020° and 050° at speeds estimated between 600 and 3600 knots. Some 'painted' for no more than a few sweeps of the RSR. No sonic booms were reported at these times and no correlating returns were held by 3CRU or SURAD, although brief excitement was generated by an occasional descending meteorological balloon.

11. The standard of reporting by AACC personnel continued to be vague and incomplete and there was no ready explanation of why contacts were being reported well within the Round Mountain Unattended Radar (RMUA) coverage. A team of 3 Air Defence Controllers was therefore despatched to the AACC at PM hours on 2 July 1983 to begin continuous operation at Sector 7. This team consisted of SQNLDR B. Niblett, CC 3CRU, graduate of the GDEW course, FLTLT J. Gardon, ADCI 3CRU, a former RADTECH, AND FLGOFF S. Snow, 114CRU, who had completed the Identification Officer's Course.

12. These officers were briefed to undertake three tasks, viz:

- a. To plot as accurately as possible every contact, calculating a precise heading and speed and examining general characteristics,

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- b. To control interceptors against these contacts if a reasonable chance of interception presented itself, and
- c. To seek a technical explanation of why these contacts were not seen at all by the RMUA.

Investigations at Mascot AACC

13. FLGOFF Snow, being first to arrive, began operations at 1430 hours on 2 July 1983. Upon plotting one or two contacts sweep by sweep he was able to report a slight clockwise spiral movement. This was consistent with a type of radar interface colloquially known as 'running rabbits and immediately explained why all previously reported alterations of course had been minor and to the right.

14. Follow up action by the remainder of the team from about 1630 hours consisted of:

- a. checking the background of what had been reported by AACC staff,
- b. establishing whether or not the RMUA had generated any of the contacts,
- c. requesting assistance to conduct a technical investigation into the performance of the RSR by implementing suitable test procedures, and
- d. the implementation of such test procedures and analysis of results.

15. In the first instance it became apparent that none of the technical staff would admit to the statement that the objects observed were likely to be man-made, a key element in Reference A, and, in the second instance, technical staff were adamant that no contacts had been generated by the RMUA, on which the presentation of tracks is computer-initiated and transmitted by data link to Mascot. Overlap by the Sydney RSR, however, does occur into the RMUA area up to 165 n miles from Sydney.

16. In the third instance, CC 3CRU asked whether any comparison had been carried out between the AACC Operators' presentation and the technical maintenance radarscope in the workshop across the corridor from the AACC at the time of the sightings. This rather elementary test had not been done, although the phenomena had been noticed since early June.

17. Further enquiries revealed that a test picture could be taken from several stages in the receiver chain of the RSR and a test procedure was set up accordingly. When the picture generated by the radar processor was examined in conjunction with an AACC sighting, definite solid bars of interference occurred on the same radial. By the time this information was further refined within the radar, however, it was obviously presented to the operator in the AACC as a rapidly moving, aircraft-like contact.

18. A picture was en drawn from a position as close

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- 4 -

to the waveguide inlets for both receivers as possible. This meant that virtually 'raw' video would be observed on the maintenance 'scope'. While this would also present weather returns, ground clutter, etc, any solid object in the radar beam capable of returning an echo would be seen at that stage. At the time when the customary phenomena were being observed in the AACC, no moving airborne objects appeared in the corresponding position as raw video. These tests proved beyond reasonable doubt that the unidentified objects reported by Sydney were generated entirely by radar interference affecting the RSR.

19. The first opportunity to discuss the matter with senior technical staff at DOA occurred on Monday 4 July 1983. At a suitably arranged conference agreement was reached that the radar contacts in question were not man-made. A cautiously worded press statement was released as a result in a manner that would not embarrass departmental personnel. 3CRU was stood down from the operation at 1620 hours that day.

COSTS OF OPERATION

20. The events controlled by 3CRU were held to as low a key as possible commensurate with the efficient running of the operation. The unit was placed in two twelve-hour shifts with minimum maintenance staff to cover the various major equipments and sufficient operational personnel to ensure that an alert surveillance/tracking/intercept team was on watch at all times. Some extra equipment and administrative effort was also required.

21. Even so 66½ man days of overtime was accrued by enlisted members, being 37½ to maintenance, 6 for administration/equipment support and 23 to operations. Officers were rostered for a considerable number of extra duties and some attended voluntarily.

22. Service transport and accommodation was used for the detachment to Mascot AACC. This involved about 1000 km travelled by staff car and nine man days of incidental allowances and out of pocket meal claims as members were largely absent from Service messes at standard meal times. One C130 may have been diverted to Sydney Airport to deliver FLGOFF Snow on the Saturday.

23. Planned maintenance at 3CRU was disrupted and fell behind by 3 days and No 6 Air Defence Identification Officer's Course started a day late because students and instructors were required to stand-to during the operation, and No 6 Myriad Maintenance Programmer's Course was delayed by 3 days through lack of access to equipment.

RESPONSE BY 3CRU MEMBERS

24. The response by 3CRU members throughout was exemplary. Although nothing was sighted and the incoming reports given little credence from the earliest stages, all Operations Flight personnel applied themselves to the task

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with the utmost seriousness and concentration, to the extent that individual COMPOPs were reluctant to break for meals in case the software became unserviceable in their absence.

26. The radar, software and support systems operated without a break throughout the entire period, which reflects credit upon unit technicians. Moreover the radar picture remained at all times of high quality, engendering confidence in its use.

26. The greatest praise is reserved for the AACC investigatory team. These officers at very short notice undertook an open-ended attachment involving long hours of travel and duty and irregular meals. In swift order they established the facts and set up definitive tests to display wherein the fault lay. In dealing with civilians in an awkward situation a considerable amount of tact had to be displayed, realizing the strong union influence within the DOA organization.

CONCLUSIONS

27. The UFO sightings at AACC Mascot, having occurred over a period of several weeks before becoming the subject of a highly charged message, elicited puzzlement rather than belief among ADGE personnel. Their pattern and speeds were inconsistent and irrational and nothing had been reported by any other agency.

28. On the spot investigations by suitably qualified Air Defence Controllers quickly resulted in a convincingly negative report. The methods used in these investigations were reasonably elementary and could have been instigated between AACC operational and technical staff in the preceeding weeks. The lines of communication, extending as they did across the width of an entire corridor, seem to have been insufficient for the purpose.

29. 3CRU staff responded willingly and cheerfully, working continuously in 12 hour shifts or remaining on standby at home without being ordered. Enlisted members accrued overtime was high, maintenance and training fell behind, and some incidental costs were incurred.

RECOMMENDATIONS

30. Phenomena such as initiated this operation should be thoroughly analysed as soon as they occur, using such methods as:

- a. comparison between various sensors covering the same area,
- b. accurate plotting and evaluation of the movements of the abserved objects,
- c. seeking advice and assistance from better qualified and more experienced personnel

when available, and

- d. conducting a thorough internal investigation of electronic equipment by setting suitable test procedures in train and analysing results, and
- e. investigating any source of practical jokes.

31. An alert over an entire air defence sector should be a last step in the investigatory chain, not the first.

32. The importance of data-linking the various radar sensors in an air defence sector is highlighted. Work has begun on this and should be allocated a high priority.

33. Finally the importance of an up to date recall plan is emphasized. In this 3CRU is well served by computer print-out.

20 Jul 83

(K.A. KEENAN)
SQNLDR
XO 3CRU

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UFO REPORTS BY AACC SYDNEY FROM
302035 JUN 83 TO 012359 JUL 83

(m)

TIME	REPORTED BY	BRG/RANGE	HDG	SPEED	REMARKS
302035	SYD	(005SYD125) 355WLM50	050	FAST(1)	Held 12 Seconds. Not seen by 3CRU
010322	SYD	275SYD105	NW	FAST	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU
0340	SYD	340SYD130	?	?	Held briefly. Not seen by 3CRU
0515	SYD	(079SYD127) 115WLM120	070	SLOW	Classified Met Balloon. Held by 3CRU. Faded 120/135 on desc From FL240.
0605	SYD	335SYD155	030	FAST	Held 2 sweeps. Not held by 3CRU.
0733	SYD	005SYD155	030	FAST	2 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.
0742	SYD	005SYD72	030	FAST	3 sweeps. Not seen by 3CRU.
0936	SYD	(019SYD78) 090WLM10	?	?	Query by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU
1028	SYD	(357SYD87) 300WLM25	020	M1.2	60 seconds. Not seen by 3CRU.
1120	SYD	050SYD120	?	?	Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.
1121	SYD	050SYD135	?	?	Single echo. Not seen by 3CRU.
1446	SYD	(005SYD138) 355WLM65	030	FAST	Report as faster than normal jet traffic. Held for 20 Nmiles by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.
2018	SYD	010SYD98	020	FAST	Held briefly. Nothing seen by 3CRU
2214	SYD	360SYD110	N	FAST	Faded 350SYD120 after 15 secs held by SYD. Nothing seen by 3CRU.
2216	SYD	360SYD138	N	V.FAST	Probably reappearance of 2214 track. Nothing seen by 3CRU
2216:20	SYD	003SYD145	N	V.FAST	
2216:30	SYD	003SYD158	N	V.FAST	
2221	SYD	012SYD165	?	?	One sweep. Not seen by 3CRU
2325	SYD	003SYD153	020	FAST	Track appeared to turn onto 030 at 005SYD163 and faded at 005SYD165. Held by SYD less than 2 mins. Not seen by 3CRU.

Notes:

1. Fast indicates not below 600 knots. Some speeds appear well in excess of 1000 knots.

ANNEX B TO
3CRU/85/59/AIR

UFO REPORTS - 15 JUL 83 - ACC SYDNEY FROM 020001Z - 3 022359Z JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	Hdg	SPD	HT	REMARKS
0230	SECT 8	005/100	N	FAST	-	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD NOT SEEN BY 3CRU
0320	"	336/124	N	400	-	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD. NS3CRU
0437	SECTOR 7	360/120	020	750	-	16 SWEEPS AT SECT 7; WHEN PLOTTED BY 3CRU ON PAPER, HDG AND SPD WORKS OUT AT 040° 1050 KTS (±200) NS3CRU
0437½	"	005/135				
0439	"	008/150				
0608	"	005/137	025	700	-	13 SWEEPS AT SECT 7. NS3CRU
0609	"	008/152				
0630	"	003/90	010	600+	-	3 GOOD PRINTS. NS3CRU
0636	"	005/112	010	600+	-	1 PRINT ONLY (POSS. RELATED TO PREVIOUS CONTACT).
1803	"	004/154	060	-	-	HELD BRIEFLY. NS3CRU
2240	"	357/87	170	900	-	HELD AS FIRM CONTACT BY SYD FOR 20+ NMILES. NSCRU OR WLM SURAB
2241	"	355/62				

ANLEY C TO

3CRU/83/59/AIKL

DATED 14 JUL 83

UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY AFCC SYDNEY FROM 030001Z JUL 83 TO 032359Z JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPD	HT	REMARKS	Notes
0321	SY	330/140	120°	600	EST HIGH	CONTACT FOR 6 SWEEPS (APPROX 12M)	
0643	SY	350/135	170°	-	-	NO SPD/HT GIVEN.	
0703	SY	352/148	170°	-	-	NO SPD/HT GIVEN. 3 SWEEPS ONLY.	
0953	SY	356/125	S	400	-	BELIEVED BY SYD TO BE INTERFERING HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA. NS3CRU	
0953	WLM APP	001/112 (340WLM 40)	170	M1515 M120	-	HELD BRIEFLY BY WLM SURAD. PLOTS ABOUT 15 NAILES SE OF SYD CONTRA AT SAME TIME. HEAVY WX. 3 PAGES ONLY. NS3CRU	
1000	3CRU	352/102 (310WLM 40)	120	400	-	CEISSING AIRCRAFT WHICH FLEW OUT TO SYD. LINES UP WITH SYDNEY 0953 REPORT.	
1411	SY	010/115	S	-	-	HELD UNTIL FADED OVER WLM AT 1425. NS3CRU. HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA.	
2310	SY	010/140	180	-	-	HELD 2-3 SWEEPS BY SYD NS3CRU NSSURAD	

NOTE: 'CEASE TELL' OCCURRED FROM 2310 AT START OF CONFERENCE WITH DOA TECHNICIANS AT MASCOT

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY

0001 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2359 24

(REPORTED)
PREVIOUS SIGHTINGS

30 JUN 83

01 JUL 83

02 JUL 83

03 JUL 83

1000 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1000 LOCAL

ANNEX D TO
3000/83/57/ANZ
DATED 14 JUL 83

28 6184

No 3 Control and Reporting Unit
RAAF Base
WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314

3CRU/83/59/AIR(30)
cc3CRU/5/7/AIR(5)

12 July 1983

Headquarters RAAF Williamtown

OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTERS'

Reference: HQOC 073/SOINT SIG EAI dated 300350ZJUN83



INTRODUCTION

1. Following receipt of Reference A, Operation 'Close Encounters' was set in train to resolve unexplained sightings of allegedly airborne, man-made objects by the staff of the Sydney AACC. The movements of these objects were said to be consistent with those of aircraft.

AIM

2. As requested by HQWLM, this report will outline, very briefly, the effects of this operation on 3CRU.

METHOD

3. 3CRU was directed at 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to begin surveillance at 0600 hours Friday 1 July 1983. The unit was organized into two shifts of 12 hours duration with sufficient technical staff on hand to provide a specialist for all types of equipment outside normal working hours and sufficient operations staff to ensure that those on surveillance would always be fresh and alert. Some equipment and administrative support was also required.

4. A report chain was established with RAAF ATC Sector 8, Mascot and UHF communications were maintained with aircraft on alert 2 in case of scrambles.

5. From the start, unit executives and controllers entertained doubts about the soundness of the theories held by DOA members. Furthermore, nothing was seen on the TPS-43 radar which correlated with DOA sightings, so a team of three Air Defence Controllers was despatched to AACC Mascot to investigate the matter in greater depth.

RESULTS

6. The investigating team proved beyond reasonable doubt by Sunday 3 July 1983 that the unidentified objects were generated entirely from interference within the processor of the Sydney Route Surveillance Radar (RSR). At no time were any correlated sightings made by 3CRU, SURAD WLM or the Round Mountain Radar near Armidale.

7. All sightings were plotted along with chronological records and remarks made at the time. A more comprehensive report including all this detail is held at 3CRU and is available if required. No aircraft were scrambled.

	ACT	INF	ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
HQWLM			REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO			
4815QN				XO			
77SQN			REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO			
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
265QN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL							
PTS							
AR							
TIAL INST.							



COSTS

8. Accrued overtime for this operation totalled 66½ man days, being 37½ days for technical staff, 23 for operations and 6 for equipment and administrative support. Officers naturally worked a considerable number of extra rostered hours and several attended voluntarily for various periods.

9. The cost of sending the three officers to Sydney is not yet fully known. A Service vehicle was used continuously for 3 days and some out of pocket meals and phone calls will have to be claimed for.

10. No 6 ADIO course was started one day late as a direct result, and scheduled maintenance fell behind by three days.

CONCLUSION

11. In spite of the alarming contents of Reference A, no corroboration of UFOs was offered by any other agency and the mystery was laid to rest quickly by an investigative team from 3CRU/114MCRU using common sense and methods that could have been applied at AACC Mascot before Reference A was raised. While 3CRU's financial costs attributable to the operation appear slight there was a much greater cost in accrued overtime for airmen, disruption of domestic and operational routines and delays in the training schedule. Fortunately there was no temptation to launch aircraft and add to the fuel bill occasioned by use of the RAAF Datsun between 3CRU, Sydney AACC and 2SD.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. Data linking between the various radar sensors in South Eastern Australia (upon which preliminary work has been done) should be progressed as a priority matter. Direct comparisons could then be made at any time and false alarms could be avoided by early discussion between agencies.



(K.A. KEENAN)
Squadron Leader
T/Commanding Officer

3
ed Aug 79
ck No. 7530-66-052-8064

MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION


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Write or Print Clearly

From BSWLM	File 17/2/AIR (16)	Date 20 JUL 83	References A. HQOC FMI OIR/COFS of 25 JUL 83
To HQWLM	Attention STANDO		
For Information			
Subject OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER			

THE FOLLOWING BSWLM DETAILS ARE PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO
REF A :

SECTION	EQUIPMENT / MANPOWER	HOURS ACCRUED
ATC	MANPOWER	208
TELECOMMUNICATIONS	MANPOWER - RADTECH	136
	- COMMSOP	116
EQUIPMENT	MANPOWER (WAREHOUSE AND FUEL FARM)	124
TRANSPORT	MANPOWER	80
	EQUIPMENT (SWEEPER)	16
CATERING	MANPOWER	350
	EQUIPMENT - MEALS CONSUMED 105	—
MEDICAL	MANPOWER - NURS	130
	MO	130
TOTAL BSWLM MANHOURS ACCRUED		1334
MARINE	MANPOWER	660
	EQUIPMENT 1 CRAFT ON SBY	
TOTAL		1984

Signature 	Name B. VITNELL	Rank FLYLT	Appointment ADMINI	Phone No 6171
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

From 20CV	File 2/3/AIR (1)	Date 20 JUL 83	References A. HQWLM ORDER 11/83 OF 1 JUL 83 
To HQWLM	Attention XO		
For Information 77 SQN	CO		
Subject EXERCISE CLOSE ENCOUNTER - OVERTIME ACCRUED			

1. As directed by OC, the following overtime data is provided for duty associated with Exercise Close Encounter:

Aircrew (20CV instructional staff)	175 hours
Engineering Officers	43 hours
Technical Airmen	540 hours
Total for Unit	758 hours

2. The overtime hours above cover 20CV personnel and exclude 77 SQN aircrew who worked standby shifts over the weekend 2/3 JUL 83.

3. Apart from four sorties of tactical intercepts (staff continuation training) flown at the end of alert periods before the start of the normal flying day on 15 JUL 83, no flying was achieved as a result of the exercise alert. Indeed, the requirement to maintain alert status through Friday 15 JUL 83 forced the cancellation of six sorties of staff continuation training.

481 SQN	386 MMIC & STRIP CLEARANCE	77 SQN	208 HRS	AIRCREW,
	124 GSEES			
3 AIR FLT	2x65 TECH AIRMEN			
	2x65 AIR CREW			

Signature M.B. Nixon	Name M.B. NIXON	Rank WGCDR	Appointment CO 20CV	Phone No. 6770
-------------------------	--------------------	---------------	------------------------	-------------------

→ B for file

WOD					
PTS					
SAR					
SSGL					
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:					

418
NNNN CZCOHA000

RR RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 022 2060638

ZNY RRRRR

R 250640Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG EMI

018/COFS

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. HQOC 387/COFS OF 01JUL83

1. THE REFERENCE DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS OF HQWLM AND HQAMB PARTICIPATE IN INVESTIGATION OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR.
2. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE FULL DETAILS OF EQUIPMENT/MANPOWER RESOURCES COMMITTED AND THE MANPOWER OVERTIME HOURS ACCRUED IN MEETING THIS TASK

BT



RESTRICTED

'83 JUL 25 11:20

RAAF
COMMCFN

	FOR		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT INF NFA	
	ACT	INF				
HQWLM			REPLY DIRECT	OC		
BSWLM	✓		(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO		
481SQN	✓			XO		
775SQN	✓		REPLY TO OC	OPSO		
20 CU	✓		FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO	✓	
4 FLT				BFSO		
3CRU			REPLY TO STANDO	INTELO		
265QN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF		
AJWE				WOD		
66GL			1 AUG 83			
PTS			STANDO Please consolidate			
SAR	✓					

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

17/26/MA
A1

Stando
not (Folgs)
(Hase) AOC wants to know by Friday
29 July 83

NNNN

RESTRICTED

29
23

RESTRICTED

098

'83 JUL -4 -7 :15

NNNNVZCZCOHA705 HH

PP RAYRWB

RAAF
COMMGEN

DE RAYWPA 209 1850701

ZNY RRRRR

P R 040701Z JUL 83

FM DEFAIRA CANBERRA

TO RAYROB/HQOC

INFO RAYWYD/CDFS CANBERRA

RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYRWB/HQWLM

BT

RESTRICTED

SIG HEE

835/DGOPS-AF

UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 1 JUL 83

B. TELECON DGOPS/GPCAPT TIPPING OF 4 JUL 83

1. REFERENCE A INSTRUCTED HQOC TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION.

2. IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE LACK OF CONFIRMED CORROBORATION OF THE TRACKS BY OTHER RADARS, CAS HAS DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS INVOLVED BE REVERTED TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THIS CONFIRMS ADVICE PROVIDED AT REFERENCE B

BT

	FOR		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
	ACT	INF					
HQWLM			REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO			
4815QN				XO			
775QN			REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO			
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
265QN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:							

17/26/83
PWA

RESTRICTED



101

IMMEDIATE **RESTRICTED**

'83 JUL -4 -7 26

NNNNVZCZCOHA711 HH
 OO RAYRWB
 DE RAYROB 005 1850700
 ZNY RRRRR
 O 040656Z JUL 83

RAAF
 COMMCEM

FM HQOC
 TO RAYRWB/HQWLM
 INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB
 BT
 R E S T R I C T E D
 SIG ADA
 410/COFS
 FOR OCS
 OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER.

17/26/1983
RAA

	FOR		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
	ACT	INF					
HQWLM	☒	☐	REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM	☐	☐	(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO	☒		
4815QN	☐	☐		XO			
775QN	☐	☐	REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU	☐	☐	FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO			
4 FLT	☐	☐		BFSO			
3CRU	☐	☐	REPLY TO	INTELO			
265QN	☐	☐	HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE	☐	☐		WOD			
66GL	☐	☐					
PTS	☐	☐					
SAR	☐	☐					
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:							

REF A. TELECON LOWERY/TIPPING 040615Z.

1. CONFIRMING REF A, RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERED AND QUICK RESPONSE TO SITUATION.
2. EFFORTS BY SQNLDR NIBLETT AND HIS TEAM FROM 3CRU AND 114CRU DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION. IT WAS LARGELY THROUGH THEIR EFFORTS THAT DOFA WERE FORCED INTO RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS MATTER. WELL DONE

BT

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

VZCZCOHA664

HH

IMMEDIATE

02 RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 949 1850517

'83 JUL -4 -5 37

ZNY RRRRR

O R 040520Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

398/SOOPSB

FOR XOWLM, XOAMB, DEFAIR FOR DOPS-AF.

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS


REF A. TELECON XOAMB/XOWLM/STROPS OF 4JUL83

1. THIS MSG CONFIRMS REF A. F111 INVOLVMENT IN OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS NO LONGER REQUIRED. ASSETS ARE TO REDEPLOY TO AMBERLEY AT EARLIEST. NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS APPLY. MANY THANKS
BT

17/26/83
(MAY)

	FOR		ACT BE TAKEN	RAAF COMM CEN HQWLM	ACT INF NFA
	ACT	INF			
HQWLM				REPLY DIRECT	OC
BSWLM				(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO
4815QN					XO
775QN				REPLY TO OC	OPSO
20 CU				FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO
4 FLT					BFSO
3CRU				REPLY TO	INTELO
265QN				HQWLM BY	ORWOFF
AJWE					WOD
66GL					
PTS					
SAR					

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:



RESTRICTED

831

RESTRICTED

NNNNVZCZCOHA236

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYWPA 063 182051Z

ZNY RRRRR

O R 010514Z JUL 83 ZZM1

FM DEFAIRA CANBERRA

TO RAYROB/HQOC

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYWYD/CDFS CANBERRA

BT

RESTRICTED

SIG HEE

A0917/DGOPS-AF



'83 JUL -1 -5 58

This message is a correction.
Destroy other copies.

FOR	ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
BSWLM	REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)	OC			
481SQN		ADMINSO			
775SQN	REPLY TO OC	XO			
20 CU	FOR SIGNATURE	OPSO			
4 FLT		STANDO			
3CRU	REPLY TO HQWLM BY	RFSO			
265SQN		INTELO			
AJWE		ORWOFF			
66GL		WOD			
PTS					
SAR					

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

17/26/83
(MA)

[Handwritten signature]

UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. TELECON DGOPSAF/COFS OF 30 JUN 83

B. HQOC 073/50INT OF 300350Z JUN 83

1. THIS MESSAGE, INTER ALIA, CONFIRMS ORAL INSTRUCTIONS PASSED VIA REFERENCE A.

2. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR IN RECENT WEEKS (REF B), HQOC IS TO TAKE ACTION TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE OF THESE AND ANY FUTURE SIMILAR UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION. THIS ACTION IS TO INCLUDE EXTENDED HOURS OF RADAR SURVEILLANCE AND VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS.

RESTRICTED

PAGE 2 RAYWPA 063 R E S T R I C T E D

RESTRICTED

3. AIRCRAFT STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS ARE AT DISCRETION OF AOCOC, HOWEVER THE PERIODS DURING WHICH MOST OF THE TRACKS HAVE OCCURRED ARE TO BE COVERED.

4. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED ON VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS ARE NOT, REPEAT, NOT TO CARRY WEAPONS.

5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO DEFAIR (DOPS-AF) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. CURRENT AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS.

B. ANY FURTHER DETECTIONS OF SIMILAR TRACKS AND DETAILS OF ANY RESPONSIVE ACTION ARE TO BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY.

C. A SITREP IS TO BE FORWARDED DAILY TO COVER THE SITUATION TO 1000 HOURS LOCAL. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS, ADVICE ON ANY PROGRESS MADE IN ESTABLISHING THE CAUSE OF THE TRACKS AND ANY HQOC RECOMMENDATIONS.

D. A FINAL REPORT WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE OPERATION.

6. AT THIS STAGE IT IS PLANNED THAT AIRCRAFT STANDBY BE CONTINUED FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK. HOWEVER, THIS ASPECT WILL BE KEPT UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF ALL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS

BT

RESTRICTED

LINE 1	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS RESTRICTED RESTRICTED
LINE 2	
LINE 3	
LINE 4	
LINE 5	

'83 JUL -4 -1 38

PRECEDENCE - ACTION	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS										
PRIORITY		040130Z JUNE 83	TABULATED										
ROUTINE INDICATORS	NOTE: Write only one addressee per line		SIG/ORIG NO										
	FROM HQ NLM		SIG ADA										
	TO HQOC		OTC / X0										
	INFO DEFAIR CANBERRA												
	HQAMB		GR										
HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC													
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER SITREP NO 3													
A DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 010514Z JUL 83													
B HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83													
1 2X MIA AND 1X FIII RELEASED FROM ALERT SIXTY WEF 032200Z JUL 83. ABOVE ALERT STATES WILL RECOMMENCE, IF NECESSARY, AT 040800Z JUL 83.													
2. 3CRU REMAINS ON 24 HOUR OPERATIONS. SURAD AND FULL ATC SERVICES REMAIN ON CALL OUTSIDE PROMULGATED OPERATING HOURS.													
3 UNIDENTIFIED RADAR CONTACTS REPORTED BY SYD, BUT NOT VERIFIED BY ANY OTHER CIVIL OR MILITARY RADAR, ARE:													
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>TIME</th> <th>POSN</th> <th>HOG</th> <th>SPD</th> <th>REMARKS</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>0321</td> <td>330 SYD 140</td> <td>120</td> <td>600K</td> <td>HELD FOR 6 SWEEPS</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				TIME	POSN	HOG	SPD	REMARKS	0321	330 SYD 140	120	600K	HELD FOR 6 SWEEPS
TIME	POSN	HOG	SPD	REMARKS									
0321	330 SYD 140	120	600K	HELD FOR 6 SWEEPS									

PAGE NO		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE				PHONE NO		REF FILE NO			
1											
NO OF PAGES		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE				SIGNATURE		DATE			
2											
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
											RESTRICTED

LINE 1

LINE 2

LINE 3

LINE 4

LINE 5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND
SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONSRESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE - ACTION	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
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ROUTINE INDICATORS	NOTE: Write only one addressee per line FROM TO	SIG/ORIG NO GR
--------------------	---	-----------------------

TIME	POSN	HDC	SPD	REMARKS
0634	350 SYD 135	170	-	HELD BRIEFLY
0705	352 SYD 148	170	-	HELD FOR 3 SWEEPS
0953	356 SYD 125	S	400K	BELIEVED WX INTERFERENCE
1411	010 SYD 115	S	-	HELD UNTIL 1425. HEAVY WX IN AREA.
2310	010/140	180	-	HELD FOR 3 SWEEPS.

4. IN VIEW OF THIS AND PREVIOUS SITREPS, I STRONGLY
RECOMMEND RETURN OF FIII TO AMB. IF FIII RESPONSE
STILL CONSIDERED NECESSARY SUGGEST OCAMB BE TASKED
TO PROVIDE ONE FIII ON ALERT 60 AT AMB BETWEEN
0800Z AND 2200Z DAILY.

PAGE NO 2	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE CAPT R.F. LOWERY XO HQWCM	PHONE NO 6001	REF FILE NO 1726/AM				
NO OF PAGES 2	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE 04 JUL 83				
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE TIME	SYSTEM OPERATOR	D	DATE TIME	SYSTEM OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED

818

IMMEDIATE

23

NNNNVZCZCOHA223

UU

'83 JUL -1 -4 55

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 422 1820407

ZNR UUUUU

O 010350Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO HQWLM

BT

UNCLAS

SIG ADA

387/COFS

FOR OC FROM COFS

SURVEILLANCE TASKING

UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE YOU ARE TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF TWO UNARMED
MIRAGE AIRCRAFT ON ALERT TWO TO ELECTRONICALLY OR VISUALLY IDENTIFY
UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY
SYDNEY RADAR. AIRCRAFT SHOULD NOT BE USED UNLESS CONFIRMATION OF
ANY REPORTED TRACKS IS FORTHCOMING FROM 3CRU, WLM SURAD OR
ANY RADAR OTHER THAN SYDNEY

BT

17/26/98
(M)negotial
by ocRAAF
COMMCFN

	FOR		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
	ACT	INF					
HQWLM							
BSWLM			REPLY DIRECT (COPY HQWLM)	OC			
481SQN				ADMINSO			
77SQN				XO			
20 CU			REPLY TO OC FOR SIGNATURE	CPSO			
4 FLT				STANDO			
3CRU				BESO			
26SQN			REPLY TO HQWLM BY	INTELO			
AJWE				ORWOFF			
66GL				WOD			
PTS							
SAR							

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Telephone 28.7777

Headquarters
RAAF Base
WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314HQWLM 17/26/AIR
HQWLM 7/4/AIR(2)

1 July 1983

Headquarters RAAF Williamtown Operation Order No 11/83 - Exercise Close EncounterReference: A. Telecon COFS/OCWLM of approximately 300930ZJUN83Time Zone Used Throughout This Order: ZULUTask Organization: No 2 Operational Conversion Unit
No 77 Squadron
No 3 Control and Reporting Unit
No 481 Squadron
Base Squadron RAAF Williamtown

1. Situation. Headquarters RAAF Williamtown has been tasked vide Reference A to provide air defence resources for the identification of unknown radar contacts reported by Department of Aviation (D of A) air traffic control agencies in Sydney. The radar contacts, travelling at high speed, have appeared to the north of Sydney out to 150nm and have been assessed by D of A as almost certainly resulting from man-made objects.

a. Energy Forces NIL

b. Friendly Forces NIL

2. Mission. To validate the unknown radar contacts reported by D of A Sydney and to identify those contacts by radar and airborne identification.

a. Activity Period. This task remains current on a 24-hour-a-day basis until cancelled by HQOC.b. Provision of Forces.

(1) Aircraft. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine resources to provide two (2) Mirage aircraft on alert 2 plus one (1) spare Mirage for identification missions until 040200ZJUL83. Alert aircraft are to be configured with either gun-bay and wet leading edge fuel tanks or with supersonic fuel tanks.

(2) Aircrew. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine to maintain an aircrew roster for alert duties drawing on all 20CU staff pilots, all 77SQN pilots of Category C or higher and all HQWLM pilots.

(3) No 3 Control and Reporting Unit. CO 3CRU is to provide radar surveillance and intercept control for fighter aircraft until the task is cancelled.

(4) Base Squadron. COBS is to provide ATC radar surveillance and appropriate ATC facilities until the task is cancelled.

(5) Command and Control. The normal command and control chain is to apply, except that promulgated Authorizing Officers from either 77SQN or 20CU assigned to this operation may authorize flights by any qualified aircrew in any aircraft assigned specifically to this operation. This exception will pertain until the task is cancelled.


3. Execution

- a. BSWLM and 3CRU. Continuous surveillance is to be maintained by ATC and 3CRU and all radar contacts are to be identified in consultation with DoA. 3CRU is to attempt to confirm the existence of unidentified contacts reported by Sydney ATC and, if confirmed, scramble Mirage aircraft to identify the contact.
- b. Scramble Procedure. Mirage aircraft are to be scrambled directly from 3CRU via UHF.
- c. Identification Procedure. Mirage pilots are to attempt an SOP identification pass on any unidentified aircraft designated by 3CRU which appears on the Mirage's A1 radar.
- d. Intercept Safety Rules. Normal rules of safety are to apply. In particular, the provisions of HQOC ASIs 1/A/1, and Annex A to 2/B/2 are to be strictly observed.
- e. Rules of Engagement. Sorties are to be flown in accordance with Rules of Engagement as nominated by OCWLM from JSP(AS) 38 Chapter 6.
- f. Flight Limitations. All aircrew are to strictly observe the flight envelope limitations relevant to the current Mirage safety equipment fit and to the aircraft's configurations.

4. Administration and Logistics

- a. Aircraft Maintenance. BENG0 is to co-ordinate the allocation of technical manpower resources from 77SQN, 20CU and 481SQN for the provision of maintenance and turn around support for aircraft assigned to this task.
- b. 481SQN. CO 481SQN is to provide arrestor barrier support and maintain strip-recovery alert on a 24 hour-a-day basis.
- c. BSWLM. COBS is to provide the following support:
 - (1) ATC Van. The ATC Van is required for ORP maintenance support. Telephone services are to be provided to the van.
 - (2) Refuelling Tankers. 20CU is to receive refuelling priority.
 - (3) Messing. All messes are to be manned to cater for task activities. BCATO is to liaise with CO 20CU, CO 3CRU and CO 481SQN to define messing requirements.
 - (4) Central Store. Provision is to be made for units to access the central store at all times.

5. Command and Signal
- a. IFF/SIF. Routine 20CU and 3CRU callsigns are to be used.
6. Acknowledgement Instructions. Do not acknowledge.



(W.D.J. MONAGHAN)
Air Commodore
Officer Commanding

Distribution:

Copy Nos:

Headquarters RAAF Williamtown	1- 5
Base Squadron RAAF Williamtown	6-10
No 77 Squadron	11-15
No 481 Squadron	16-21
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No 3 Control and Reporting Unit	25-28
Unit History	29-30
HQWLM File 7/4/Air	31
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Spares	34-40

External:

Headquarters Operational Command	33
----------------------------------	----

651.

PRIORITY
NNNNVZCZCOHA986

PP RAYRWB RAYRWA

DE RAYROB 325 1810439

ZNY RRRRR

P R 300350Z JUN 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWBHQWLM

INFO RAYRWA/3CRU

RAYRMD/HQRIC

RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG EAI

073/SOINT

UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT SIGHTING

1. SINCE 6 JUN 83 A NUMBER OF UNIDENTIFIED RADAR RETURNS HAVE BEEN DETECTED BY SYDNEY ATC PERSONNEL. ON EACH OCCASION THE OBSERVED RETURNS HAVE BEEN STRONG AND THE MOVEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF AN AIRCRAFT. ON ONLY ONE OCCASION WAS 3CRU ON THE AIR. WHILE 3CRU OBSERVED THE RETURN THEY WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN AN ALTITUDE.

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE CONTACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

072230Z JUN 83 - CTC OVER COWRA TRACKING 090 DEGREES SPEED 1400 KTS
130638Z JUN 83 - FAST CTC 150 NMS NTH SYD HDG 170 DEGREES
170940Z JUN 83 - FAST A/C CTL BETWEEN 90 AND 60 NMS NTH SYD

RESTRICTED



JUN 30 -6 39

21
Read in entirety to
S/L NIBLETT over phone
at OC's direction 1000hrs
14683 Gbmk

Photocopy given to
S/L BATTEN.

1 Photocopy
Signed by to FIO
1645 hrs 30 JUN 83
30 JUN 83
Chwoff

	FOR		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
	ACT	INF					
HQWLM			REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO			
481SQN				XO			
775SQN			REPLY TO OC	OPSD			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO			
4 FLT				BFSD			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
265SQN			HQWLM BY	ORWUFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:							

17/26/83
CHW

RESTRICTED

PAGE 2 RAYROB 325 R E S T R I C T E D

RESTRICTED

190836Z JUN 83 - FAST A/C CTC 150 NMS NTH SYD HDG STH. CTC LOST
130 NMS

191948Z JUN 83 - FAST CTC 60 NMS NTH SYD HDG 360 DEGREES. CTC LOST
143 NMS

232243Z JUN 83 - A/C RETURN (FAST) OBSERVED 045 DEGREES M SYD BETWEEN
110 AND 150 NMS. HDG 045 DEGREES M SPEED APPROX 1500 KTS
ALL RETURNS WERE PRIMARY AIRCRAFT PAINTS.

2. THE SOURCE OF THE RETURNS ARE UNKNOWN. D OF A RADAR TECH STAFF
ARE OF THE OPINION THAT ALL RETURNS ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY FROM MAN
MADE OBJECT.

3. THE SIGHTINGS HAVE OCCURRED ON AN IRREGULAR BASIS AND WITH ONE
EXCEPTION EITHER EARLY MORNING OR EVENING.

4. 3 CRU IS REQUESTED TO ASSIST IN INVESTIGATING THESE UNIDENTIFIED
CONTACTS THROUGH INCREASED OPERATING TIME, IN PARTICULAR DURING
HIGH PROB PERIODS OF EARLY MORNING AND EVENING, AND BY CLOSE CO-
ORDINATION WITH SYD RAAF-SECTOR EIGHT, SMACO.

5. 3 CRU IS ASKED TO ADVISE HQOC (ATTN-SOCC) OF ABILITY TO ASSIST
OR ANY LIMITATIONS. THE DURATION OF INCREASED ACTIVITY REQUIRED
WILL BE ADVISED, PENDING DISCUSSIONS WITH DEFAIR

BT

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

20

101 IMMEDIATE

'83 JUL -4 -7 :26

NNNNVZCZCOHA711 HH

OO RAYRWB

RAAF
COMMCEN

DE RAYROB 005 1850700

ZNY RRRRR

O 040656Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

410/COFS

F0R OCS

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER.

REF A. TELECON LOWERY/TIPPING 040615Z.

1. CONFIRMING REF A, RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERED AND QUICK RESPONSE TO SITUATION.

2. EFFORTS BY SQNLDR NIBLETT AND HIS TEAM FROM 3CRU AND 114CRU DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION. IT WAS LARGELY THROUGH THEIR EFFORTS THAT DOFA WERE FORCED INTO RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS MATTER. WELL DONE

BT

RESTRICTED

098

RESTRICTED

83 JUL -4 -7 :15

NNNNVZCZCOHA705 HH

PP RAYRWB

RAAF
COMMCEM

DE RAYWPA 209 1850701

ZNY RRRRR

P R 040701Z JUL 83

FM DEFAIRÁ CANBERRA

TO RAYROB/HQOC

INFO RAYWYD/CDFS CANBERRA

RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYRWB/HQWLM

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG HEE

835/DGOPS-AF

UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 1 JUL 83

B. TELECON DGOPS/GPCAPT TIPPING OF 4 JUL 83

1. REFERENCE A INSTRUCTED HQOC TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION.

2. IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE LACK OF CONFIRMED CORROBORATION OF THE TRACKS BY OTHER RADARS, CAS HAS DIRECTED THAT ELEMENTS INVOLVED BE REVERTED TO NORMAL OPERATIONS. THIS CONFIRMS ADVICE PROVIDED AT REFERENCE B

BT

RESTRICTED

065

VZCZCOHA664

IMMEDIATE

HH

RESTRICTED

18

DE RAYROB 949 1850517

'83 JUL -4 -5 37

ZNY RRRRR

O R 040520Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

RAAF
COMMCEN

TO RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

398/SOOPSB

FOR XOWLM, XOAMB, DEFAIR FOR DOPS-AF.

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS

REF A. TELECON XOAMB/XOWLM/STROPS OF 4JUL83

1. THIS MSG CONFIRMS REF A. F111 INVOLVMENT IN OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTERS NO LONGER REQUIRED. ASSETS ARE TO REDEPLOY TO AMBERLEY AT EARLIEST. NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS APPLY. MANY THANKS

BT

RESTRICTED

064

JZCZCOHA653

HH

RESTRICTED

17

OO RAYRWB

'83 JUL -4 -5 35

DE RAYROB 930 1850445

ZNY RRRRR

O R 040432Z JUL 83

RAAF
COMMCEN

FM HQOC

TO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

397/COFS

DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, WLM, AMB FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. DEFAIR 003/DSO OF 030555Z JUL 83

1. REF A AGREED TO REDUCE ALERT STATE TO ALERT 60 AND ADVISED
CONTINUATION WOULD BE REVIEWED 04JUL83

2. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT, HOPEFULLY A PRESS RELEASE, AGREED
TO AT A MEETING HELD MASCOT 040100Z. QUOTE
AT A MEETING AT KINGSFORD SMITH AIRPORT MASCOT BETWEEN DOFA AND RAAF
REPS IT WAS AGREED THAT: IT IS LIKELY THAT THE APPARENT RETURNS
THAT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ON ONE OF THE RADARS AT SYDNEY AIRPORT ARE
CAUSED BY RANDOM ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS AND POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE.

PAGE 2 RAYROB 930 R E S T R I C T E D

MEASURES ARE BEING TAKEN TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. IT IS CONSIDERED
EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THE REPORTED CONTACTS WERE AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE
IN VIEW OF ABOVE STRONGLY RECOMMEND REVERSION TO NORMAL OPERATIONS

BT

RESTRICTED

From 3CRW	File 85/59 /AIR	Date 04 JUL 83	References
To HQWLM		Attention <u>OC</u> XO	
For Information			
Subject OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER			

1. Please find enclosed at Annex A a summary of operational information of Operation Close Encounter for the last 24 hours.

ANNEX: A. Summary of Operational Information.




Signature <i>K. A. Keenan</i>	Name K. A. KEENAN	Rank SQUAD T/CO	Appointment T/CO	Phone No. 6158
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ANNEX A TO
3CRU 85/59/ALR
DATED 04 JUL 83

0001Z 3 JUL 83 → 2359Z 03 JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPD	HT	REMARKS	Notes
0321	SY	330/140	120°	600	EST HIGH	CONTACT FOR 6 SWEEPS (APPROX 12 MILES)	
0643	SY	350/135	170°	-	-	NO SPD/HT GIVEN.	
0703	SY	352/148	170°	-	-	NO SPD/HT GIVEN. 3 SWEEPS ONLY.	
0953	SY	356/125	S	400	-	BELIEVED BY SYD TO BE INTERFERING HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA. NS3CRU	
0953	WLM APP	001/112. (340 WLM 40)	170	M1.5 to M2.0	-	HELD BRIEFLY BY WLM SURAD. PLOTS ABOUT 15 NMILES SE OF SYD CONTRA AT SAME TIME. HEAVY WX. 3 PAINTS ONLY. NS3CRU	
1000	3CRU	352/102 (310 WLM 40)	180	400	-	CLASSIFIED AIRCRAFT WHICH FLEW ON TO SYD. LINES UP WITH SYDNEY 0953 REPORT.	
1411	SY	010/115	S	-	-	HELD UNTIL FADED OVER WLM AT 1425. NS3CRU. HEAVY WEATHER IN AREA.	
2310	SY	010/140	180	-	-	HELD 2-3 SWEEPS BY SYD NS3CRU NSSURAD	



UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT SIGHTINGS REPORTED FROM

SYDNEY ATC RADAR, MASCOY AIRPORT

FROM: 0001Z 03 JUL 83

TO: 2359Z 03 JUL 83

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY

0001 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2359 24

(REPORTED)
PREVIOUS SIGHTINGS

30 JUN 83

01 JUL 83

02 JUL 83

03 JUL 83

1000 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1000 LOCAL

LINE 1		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS RESTRICTED										
LINE 2												
LINE 3												
LINE 4		83 JUL -3 -3 11										
LINE 5												
PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY		PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS								
ROUTINE INDICATORS		NOTE: Write only one addressee per line			SIG/ORIG NO							
		FROM HQWLM			SIG ADA							
		TO HQOC			2/ X6							
		DEFAIR CANBERRA										
		HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DEOPS-AF			GR							
		OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER										
		A HQWLM 001/X0 OF 030050Z JUL 83										
		1. REF A STATED THAT ROUTINE WLM TRAINING/TASKS WILL SUFFER IF CURRENT ALERT STATES CONTINUE. ASSUMING REQUIREMENT TO CONTINUE PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT RESPONSE, BEST COMPROMISE IS TO PROVIDE 2X MIR PLUS 1X FILL ON ALERT 60. THIS WOULD OBTAIN NEED TO ROTATE ALL WLM CREWS THROUGH ALERT TWO AND COULD BE MET FROM CREWS ACCOMMODATED ON BASE. ROUTINE 20CU AND 77 SQN TRAINING WOULD BE LARGELY UNAFFECTED AND 3CRU/WLM ATC COULD RESTRUCTURE ROSTERS TO ADVANTAGE.										
		2. YOUR EARLIEST RESPONSE TO THIS SUGGESTION WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.										
PAGE NO 1		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE OPCAPT R.F. LOWERY XO HQWLM		PHONE NO 6 001	REF FILE NO							
NO OF PAGES 1		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE		SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE 03 JUL 83							
FOR OPS USE	A	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED	

971
VZCZCOHA505

HH

RESTRICTED

14

IMMEDIATE

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 883 1840316

ZNY RRRRR

'83 JUL -3 -3 :37

O R 030311Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

726/COFS

DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, WLM FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. WLM 001/DO 030050Z SITREP NO 2.

B. HQOC 725/COFS 020341Z

1. REF A FURTHER SUBSTANTIATES OBSERVATIONS MADE IN SITREP NO 1 AND REF B THAT UNIDENTIFIED SIGHTINGS ARE RESULT OF ELECTRONIC PHENOMENON EXCLUSIVE TO SYDNEY ROUTE SURVEILLANCE RADAR. CLOSE CONTACT WITH RADAR TECHS BEING MAINTAINED BUT AS YET NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OBTAINED

2. IN VIEW COMMENTS PARA 5 REF A. STRONGLY RECOMMEND RESPONSE BE SCALED DOWN TO LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING NORMAL TASKS.

PAGE 2 RAYROB 883 R E S T R I C T E D

3. FOR HQWLM. IF ALERT STATE WITHDRAWN ADVISE WHAT RESPONSE COULD BE GUARANTEED. ATC SURAD MAY NOW REVERT TO NORMAL OPERATIONS.

3CRU SURVEILLANCE TO CONTINUE ON 24 HOUR BASIS

BT

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED

13

HH

PP RAYROB RAYWPP RAYBBB

DE RAYRWB 272 183005Z

ZNY RRRRR

P R 030050Z JUL 83

FM HQWLM

TO RAYROB/HQBC

INFO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

001/DO

FOR AOCOC FROM OCWLM, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC.

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER SITREP NO 2.

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 010514Z JUL 83

B. HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83

1. 2 X MIR AND 1 X F111 RELEASED FROM ALERT TWO AND ALERT THIRTY
RESPECTIVELY WEF 022200Z JUL 83. ABOVE ALERT STATES WILL
RECOMMENCE AT 030800Z JUL 83.

2. 3CRU AND SURAD REMAIN ON 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.

3. UNIDENTIFIED RADAR CONTACTS REPORTED BY SYD ARE:

TIME	POSN	HDG	SPD	REMARKS
0230	005 SYD 100	N	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY



	FOR		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	HQWLM	ACT	INF	NFA
	ACT	INF					
HQWLM			REPLY DIRECT	OC			
BSWLM			(COPY HQWLM)	ADMINSO			
481SQN				XO			
77SQN			REPLY TO OC	OPSO			
20 CU			FOR SIGNATURE	STANDO			
4 FLT				BFSO			
3CRU			REPLY TO	INTELO			
26SQN			HQWLM BY	ORWOFF			
AJWE				WOD			
66GL							
PTS							
SAR							
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:							

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

PAGE 2 RAYRWB 272 R E S T R I C T E D

0320	336	SYD	124	N	400K	HELD BRIEFLY
0437	360	SYD	120	020	750K	HELD FOR 16 SWEEPS
0608	005	SYD	137	025	700K	HELD FOR 13 SWEEPS
0630	003	SYD	90	010	600K	3 PAINTS
0636	005	SYD	112	010	600K	1 PAINT
1803	004	SYD	154	060	-	HELD BRIEFLY
2240	357	SYD	87	170	900K	HELD FOR 20NM

4. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND RAAF PERSONNEL AT SYD AACC HAVE VERIFIED THAT THESE UNIDENTIFIED RETURNS ARE ALL GENERATED SOLEY BY SYD ROUTE SURVEILLANCE RADAR. NONE, REPEAT NONE, HAVE BEEN VERIFIED BY ANY OTHER RADAR UNIT, CIVIL OR MILITARY. THEREFORE I BELIEVE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THEY ARE RESULT OF SOME ELECTRONIC PHENONENON EXCLUSIVE TO SYD RADAR AND NOT EVIDENCE OF SOME UNIDENTIFIED INTRUDER.
5. CONTINUED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WILL, I BELIEVE, SERVE TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS CONCLUSION, AND CONTINUED AIRCRAFT ALERT WILL THEREFORE SERVE NO PURPOSE OTHER THAN PREJUDICE WLM CAPACITY TO PROSECUTE NORMAL, IMPORTANT TASKS. IN PARTICULAR, I AM CONCERNED THAT FULL ATC SERVICES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FROM MONDAY IF 24 HOUR SURVEILLANCE IS SUSTAINED. THIS WILL PREJUDICE OCU

PAGE 3 RAYRWB 272 R E S T R I C T E D

TRAINING, PARTICULARLY IF WEATHER DETERIORATES. THEREFORE I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SUSPEND AIRCRAFT ALERTS FORTHWITH AND CONTINUE PURELY ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNTIL FINAL DECISION CAN BE GIVEN

BT

RESTRICTED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

Write or Print Clearly

MEMORANDUM

From 3CW	File 85/59/AIR	Date 03 JUL 83	References
To HQWLM		Attention OC XO	
For Information			
Subject OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER			

1. Please find enclosed a summary of operational information of CLOSE ENCOUNTER from 1000 hrs (LOCAL) 02 JUL 83 until 1000 hrs 03 JUL 83.

ANNEXES: A. Statistical Details
B. Information from GCI Controllers at Mascot.




Signature K.A. Keenan	Name K.A. KEENAN	Rank SQUAD	Appointment T/CO	Phone No. 6158
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO
3CRU/85/59/AIR
DATED 03 JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDR	SPD	HT	REMARKS
0230	SECT 8	005/100	N	FAST	-	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD NOT SEEN BY 3CRU
0320	"	336/124	N	400	-	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD. NS3CRU
0437	SECTOR 7	360/120	020	750	-	16 SWEEPS AT SECT 7; WHEN PLOTTED BY 3CRU ON PAPER, HDR AND SPD WORKS OUT AT 040° 1050 KTS (±200). NS3CRU
0437½	"	005/135				
0439	"	008/150				
0608	"	005/137	025	700	-	13 SWEEPS AT SECT 7. NS3CRU
0609	"	008/158				
0630	"	003/90	010	600+	-	3 GOOD PRINTS. NS3CRU
0636	"	005/112	010	600+	-	1 PRINT ONLY. (POSS. RELATED TO PREVIOUS CONTACT).
1803	"	004/154	060	-	-	HELD BRIEFLY. NS3CRU
2240	"	357/87	170	900	-	HELD AS FIRM CONTACT BY SYD FOR 20+ NMILES. NSCRU OR WLM SURAD
2241	"	355/62				




UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT SIGHTINGS REPORTED FROM
SYDNEY ATC RADAR, MASCOB AIRPORT

FROM: 020001Z JUL 83 TO: 022359Z JUL 83

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER - UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED BY DOA SYDNEY

A3



RESTRICTED

ANNEX B TO

3CRU/85/59/AIR

DATED 03 JUL 83

INFORMATION FROM GCI CONTROLLERS AT MASCOI

1. A surveillance and control (GCI) team is now established temporarily at Mascot ATCC and operating 24 hrs/day until otherwise directed.
2. Until certain civilian technical staff report for duty on Monday 04 Jul 83 some questions cannot be adequately or satisfactorily answered but preliminary enquiries reveal the following:
 - a. The sensitivity of the Sydney Route Surveillance Radar (RSR) may have been significantly increased following maintenance work in early June. The upsurge of UFO activity is coincidental.
 - b. Although most contacts reported by ATC members have appeared to move in straight lines and almost radially relative to the RSR, some have appeared to make slight alterations of course. All such alterations, however, have been to starboard, or clockwise. When carefully plotted sweep by sweep on the radarscope there is an appearance of spiral movement suggestive of a certain type of radar interference.
 - c. There is a large overlap between the RSR

RESTRICTED

and Round Mountain radar, the midpoint being about 120 miles north of Sydney, but there is no absolute cutoff for display purposes although both displays are presumably correlated. Sydney technical staff appear confident that none of the tracks in question have been generated by Round Mountain. All have been within coverage of Sydney RSR with a high proportion within the overlap.

- d. Round Mountain contacts are computer-generated. Only when the target is determined to be an aircraft and nothing else will it be presented for display. Sydney RSR approximates more to a 'raw' video display and may therefore be more prone to show a variety of dubious information.

3. At this stage GCE controllers at Mascot are sceptical of the chances that the contacts in question are solid objects, either propelled or ballistic.

K. Keenan
(K.A. KEENAN)
SQNRDR
T/CO 3CRW

RESTRICTED

019
VZCZCORA533
PRIORITY

HH

PP RAYRWB

ZNY RRRRR ZFD RAYROB

This message is a
suspected duplicate

83 JUL -3 -3 :17

HH

PP RAYWPP RAYRWB RAYBBB

RAAF
COMMEN

DE RAYROB 869 1830403

ZNY RRRRR

P 020341Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA



INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

725/COFS

DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, AMB, WLM FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

REF A. HQWLM 001/DOM020139Z. SITREP NO 1.

B. HQOC 673/SOINT 30JUN83

1. FURTHER TO REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS RESULTING
FROM OBSERVATIONS/ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT BY HQOC STWFF

A. PREVIOUS REPORTS AND THOSE IN REF A CONFINE THE MAJORITY OF
REPORTED TRACKS TO GENERALLY NORTH OF WLM USUALLY HEADING IN A
NORTHERLY DIRECTION 355-030 AND FADING TOWARDS THE LIMIT OF SYDNEY
RADAR COVERAGE 150-165 NM

RESTRICTED

B. THESE AND OTHER REPORTED TRACKS GENERALLY ALIGN TO SYDNEY RADIALS

RESTRICTED

PAGE 2 RAYROB 869 R E S T R I C T E D

C. WHILE SOME TRACKS ARE HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS VERY STRONG PAINTS THE MAJORITY ARE WEAK

D. PERIOD OF SIGHTINGS AGE REPORTED TO RANGE FROM BETWEEN ONE TO EIGHT SWEEPS AT FIVE RPM. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN EXCEPTIONS EXTENDING TO 14 SWEEPS ASSUMING SAME TRACK

D. PLOTS OF REPORTED TRACKS ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH ANY KNOWN FLIGHT PROFILES OF ANY MAN MADE OBJECT NOR ARE OBSERVATIONS CONSISTENT WITH ANY PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE

E. MAJORITY OF THE REPORTED SIGHTINGS HAVE BEEN IN LOCATIONS WITHIN ROUND MOUNTAIN, WLM SURAD AND 3CRU RADAR COVERAGE. DOFA AND RAAF ATC STAFF CONFIRM THAT NO TRACKS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED BY ROUND MOUNTAIN SINCE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS WERE FIRST OBSERVED. WLM STAFF ALSO CONFIRM THEY ALSO HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SPECIFIC TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY AS UNIDENTIFIED OR ANY OTHER EVIDENCE OF UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS ON WLM RADAR. REF B INDICATED THAT ONE TRACK HAD BEEN CORROBORATED BY 3CRU. FURTHER INQUIRIES REVEAL THAT THIS RESULTED FROM A RATHER CASUAL INQUIRY FROM SYDNEY RELATING TO AN OBSERVED TRACK ABOUT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL UNIDENTIFIED SIGHTINGS. WHILE NOT DETRACTING FROM THE ACCURACY OF THE STATEMENT IT DOES RAISE EXTREME DOUBTS ON WHETHER THIS UNRECORDED INTERCHANGE COULD

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RESTRICTED

PAGE 3MRAYROB 869 R E S T R I C T E D

BE REGARDED AS POSITIVE CORROBORATION THE LACK OF ANY FOLLOW-UP
CONFIRMATION OF TRACKS REINFORCES THIS VIEW

F. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH BUMET TO ADVISE OF ANY UNUSUAL
MET CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF OBSERVATIONS, ANAPROP BEING
ONE EXPLANATION FOR AT LEAST SOME TRACKS

G. VERBAL DISCUSSIONS WITH DOFA SENIOR ENGINEERS AND RADAR
TECHNICIANS AT MASCOT INDICATE A STRONG POSSIBILITY OF A RADAR
FAULT CAUSING THE MAJORITY OF THESE OBSERVATIONS AND APPROPRIATE
INVESTIGATION EFFORT HAS STARTED. TO DATE NO FAULT HAS BEEN
FOUND WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION AND INVESTIGATIONS ARE
CONTINUING

BT

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RESTRICTED

Department of Defence
MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN/SIGS use only.

10

LINE 1

LINE 2

LINE 3

LINE 4

LINE 5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND
SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE ACTION

PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE - INFO
ROUTINE

DATE - TIME GROUP

020139Z JUL 83

MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS

TABULATE

ROUTING INDICATORS

Note: Write only one addressee per line

FROM: HQWLM

TO: HQOC

INFO DEFAIR

HQAMB

SIG/ORIG NO

SIG ADA

001/D.O

GR



HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC.

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER SITREP NO.1

A. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 010514Z JUL 83

B. HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83

1. 2 X MIR AND 1 X FUI RELEASED FROM ALERT TWO AND
ALERT THIRTY RESPECTIVELY WEF 012359Z JUL 83.
AIRCRAFT WILL RESUME ABOVE ALERT STATES AT
020600Z JUL 83.

2. BCRU AND SURAD REMAIN ON 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.

3. UNIDENTIFIED RADAR CONTACTS REPORTED BY SYD WERE:

TIME(Z)	POSN	HDE	SPD	REMARKS
2035	005 SYD 125	OSO	FAST	HELD 12 SECS
0322	275 SYD 105	NW	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY
0340	340 SYD 130	-	-	HELD BRIEFLY
0605	375 SYD 155	OIO	FAST	HELD 2 SWEEPS

PAGE NO

1

DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE

PHONE NO

REF FILE NO

NO OF PAGES

2

RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

DATE

FOR
OPS
USE

R

DATE

TIME

SYSTEM

OPERATOR

D

DATE

TIME

SYSTEM

OPERATOR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN/SIGS use only.

LINE 1.....

LINE 2.....

LINE 3.....

LINE 4.....

LINE 5.....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND
SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

RESTRICTED

PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS TABULATE
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ROUTING INDICATORS Note: Write only one addressee per line

SIG/ORIG NO

FROM

TO

TIME(Z)	POSN	HDB	SPD	REMARKS	GR
---------	------	-----	-----	---------	----

0733	0055YD155	030	FAST	HELD 2 SWEEPS	
------	-----------	-----	------	---------------	--

0742	0055YD172	020	FAST	HELD 3 SWEEPS	
------	-----------	-----	------	---------------	--

0936	0195YD78	-	-	ONE PAINT	
------	----------	---	---	-----------	--

1028	3575YD87	020	FAST	HELD 60 SECS	
------	----------	-----	------	--------------	--

1120	0505YD120	-	-	ONE PAINT	
------	-----------	---	---	-----------	--

1121	0055YD135	-	-	ONE PAINT	
------	-----------	---	---	-----------	--

1446	0055YD128	030	FAST	HELD FOR 20 NM	
------	-----------	-----	------	----------------	--

2018	0105YD98	020	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY	
------	----------	-----	------	--------------	--

2214	3605YD110	N	FAST	HELD 15 SECS	
------	-----------	---	------	--------------	--

2216	3605YD138	N	V FAST	HELD 30 SECS	
------	-----------	---	--------	--------------	--

2221	0125YD165	-	-	HELD ONE SWEEP	
------	-----------	---	---	----------------	--

2325	0035YD153	020	FAST	HELD 120 SECS	
------	-----------	-----	------	---------------	--

NEITHER 3CRU NOR SURAD ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH
ANY OF ABOVE

4. NIL SCRAMBLE ACTION TAKEN

PAGE NO 2		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE 6PCAPT R.F. LOWERY XO HQ WEM				PHONE NO 6001		REF FILE NO			
NO OF PAGES 2		RELEASES'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE				SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>				DATE 02 JUN 83	
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED

A 273
 Issued Aug 79
 No. 7530-66-052-8064
MEMORANDUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

Write or Print Clearly

From 3CW	File 83/59/AIR	Date 02 JUL 83	References
To HQWLM		Attention OC XO	
For Information			
Subject OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER			

1. Please find enclosed operational details of CLOSE ENCOUNTER from commencement to 1700 hrs local 02 JUL 83.

ANNEX: A. 2 Copies of operational details from commencement until 1700 hrs 02 JUL 83



Signature <i>K.A. Keenan</i>	Name K.A. KEENAN	Rank SP4	Appointment T/CO	Phone No. 6158
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO
3CRW 83/59/ALR
DATED 02 JUL 83

<u>Z</u> <u>TIME</u>	<u>REPORTED BY</u>	<u>BEL/RANGE</u> (m)	<u>HDG</u>	<u>SPD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
302035JUN	SYD	(005 SYD 125) 355 WLM 50	050	FAST(1)	HELD 12 SECONDS. NOT SEEN BY 3CRW
010322JUL	SYD	275 SYD 105	NW	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY. NOT SEEN BY 3CRW
0340	SYD	340 SYD 130 (079 SYD 127)	?	?	" " " " " "
0515	SYD	115 WLM 120	070	SLOW	CLASSIFIED MET BALLOON. HELD BY 3CRW.
					FADED 120/135 ON DESC FROM FL 240
0605	SYD	335 SYD 155	030	FAST	HELD 2 SWEEPS. NOT HELD BY 3CRW
0733	SYD	005 SYD 155	030	FAST	2 SWEEPS, NOT SEEN BY 3CRW
0742	SYD	005 SYD 72	030	FAST	3 SWEEPS. NOT SEEN BY 3CRW.
0936	SYD	(019 SYD 78) 090 WLM 10	?	?	QUERY BY SYD. NOTHING SEEN BY 3CRW
1028	SYD	(357 SYD 87) 300 WLM 25	020	MI-2	60 SECONDS. NOT SEEN BY 3CRW
1120	SYD	050 SYD 120	?	?	SINGLE ECHO. NOT SEEN BY 3CRW
1121	SYD	005 SYD 135	?	?	" " " " " "
1446	SYD	(005 SYD 138) 355 WLM 65	030	FAST	REPORT AS FASTER THAN NORMAL JET TRAFFIC. HELD FOR 20 NMILES BY SYD. NOTHING SEEN BY 3CRW
2018	SYD	010 SYD 98	020	FAST	HELD BRIEFLY. NOTHING SEEN BY 3CRW
2214	SYD	360 SYD 110	N	FAST	FADED 350 SYD 120 AFTER 15 SECS HELD BY SYD. NOT SEEN 3CRW
2216	SYD	360 SYD 138	N	V.FAST	} PROBABLY REAPPEARANCE OF 2214 TRACK. NOTHING SEEN BY 3CRW
2216:20	SYD	003 SYD 145	N	V.FAST	
2216:30	SYD	003 SYD 158	N	V.FAST	
2221	SYD	012 SYD 165	?	?	ONE SWEEP NOT SEEN BY 3CRW.
2325	SYD	003 SYD 153	020	FAST	TRACK APPEARED TO TURN ONTO 030° AT 005 SYD 163 AND FADED AT 005 SYD 165. HELD BY SYD LESS THAN 2 MINS. NOT SEEN BY 3CRW.

NOTES

1. FAST INDICATES NOT BELOW
600 KNOTS. SOME SPEEDS
APPEAR WELL IN EXCESS OF
1000 KTS

0001 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2355 24

(REPORTED)
PREVIOUS SIGHTINGS


30 JUN 83

01 JUL 83

-3-

02 JUL 83

TIME(Z)	REPORTED BY	BRG/SYD/RGE	HDG	SPD	HT	REMARKS
0230	SECT 8	005/100	N	FAST	-	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD NOT SEEN BY 3CRW
0320	"	336/124	N	400	-	HELD BRIEFLY BY SYD. NS3CRW
0437	SECTOR 7	360/120	020	750	-	16 SWEEPS AT SECT 7: WHEN PLOTTED BY 3CRW ON PAPER, HDG AND SPD WORKS OUT AT 040° 1050 KTS (± 200). NS3CRW
0437½	"	005/135				
0439	"	008/150				
0608	"	005/137	025	700	-	13 SWEEPS AT SECT 7. NS3CRW
0609	"	008/158				



FP _____ M _____
 (CALLSIGN) (MIL) (TYPE)

 (FROM) (TO) (ETD/ATD)

REPORTING POINTS	FL	+ TIME
1	_____	_____
2	_____	_____
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5	_____	_____
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Start 020000H 83

MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN/SIGS use only.

8

LINE 1		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS	
LINE 2		RESTRICTED	
LINE 3			
LINE 4			
LINE 5			
PRECEDENCE - ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP 83 JUL -1 1221 RECEIVED - 4 JUL 1983 H.Q.W.L.M.	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
ROUTING INDICATORS	Note: Write only one addressee per line		SIG/ORIG NO
FROM: H.Q.W.L.M.			SIG ADA
TO: H.Q.O.C.			/
INFO: DEFAIR			GR
1. FOR HQOC FOR COFS, DEFAIR FOR DEOPS-AF, HQAMB FOR OC			
OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER			
A HQOC 387/COFS OF 01 JUL 83			
B DEFAIR A0917/DEOPS-AF OF 010514Z JUL 83			
C HQOC 724/AOC OF 010755Z JUL 83			
1. Requirements of Refs A to C are being implemented. Two F-111 aircraft have arrived and crews are briefed. However, crews are out of duty time and have been stood down. One F-111 will be on ALERT THIRTY, wot 012000Z JUL 83. Meanwhile, two Mirages are on ALERT TWO continuously. 3CARU is on 24 hour operation.			
2. In light of para 2 ref C, a review of all available records of contacts by AACC, indicate nil contacts any day between 2359Z and 0600Z. Will therefore mount two shifts of aircraft alert between 0600Z and 2359Z daily. CARU will continue 24 hour operation but at reduced manning during alert stand down.			

PAGE NO		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE				PHONE NO		REF FILE NO			
NO OF PAGES		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE				SIGNATURE		DATE			
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED											

MESSAGE FORM

NOTE: Shaded areas are for COMMCEN/SIGS use only.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND
SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

RESTRICTED

LINE 1

LINE 2

LINE 3

LINE 4

LINE 5

PRECEDENCE - ACTION

PRECEDENCE - INFO
ROUTINE

DATE - TIME GROUP

MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS

PRIORITY

ROUTING INDICATORS

Note: Write only one addressee per line

SIG/ORIG NO

FROM

TO

GR

3. Regarding para 5 ref C, one RAAF GCI controller cannot adequately cover proposed period of aircraft operations. T/C D 3CRU has discussed relief manning prospects with 1014 MCRU, who has nominated FL60FF SNOW as qualified, current and available. Request OCAMB concurrence and HQOC action to attach SNOW to 3CRU for duty AACC Maxrot wof PM hours 02 JUL 83. SNOW to report to SQUAD NIBBLET.

H. Reports will be forwarded as directed Ref B.

PAGE NO

DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE

PHONE NO

REF FILE NO

1

W.D.J. MONAGHAN OC WLM1

6000

NO OF PAGES

RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

DATE

2

6CRUPT R.F. LOWERY

[Signature]

01 JUL 82

FOR
OPS
USE

R

DATE

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SYSTEM

OPERATOR

D

DATE

TIME

SYSTEM

OPERATOR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

942

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED

NNN VZCZCOHA422

HH

RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 869 1830403

ZNY RRRRR

P 020341Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYBBB/HQAMB

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

725/COFS

DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF, AMB, WLM FOR OC

OPERATION CLOSE ENCOUNTER

REF A. HQWLM 001/DO 020139Z. SITREP NO 1.

B. HQOC 673/SOINT 30JUN83

1. FURTHER TO REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS RESULTING FROM OBSERVATIONS/ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT BY HQOC STAFF

A. PREVIOUS REPORTS AND THOSE IN REF A CONFINE THE MAJORITY OF REPORTED TRACKS TO GENERALLY NORTH OF WLM USUALLY HEADING IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION 355-030 AND FADING TOWARDS THE LIMIT OF SYDNEY RADAR COVERAGE 150-165 NM

B. THESE AND OTHER REPORTED TRACKS GENERALLY ALIGN TO SYDNEY RADIALS

RESTRICTED

RAAF
COMMCEEN

RESTRICTED

PA 2 RAYROB 869 R E S T R I C T E D

C. WHILE SOME TRACKS ARE HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS VERY STRONG PAINTS THE MAJORITY ARE WEAK

D. PERIOD OF SIGHTINGS ARE REPORTED TO RANGE FROM BETWEEN ONE TO EIGHT SWEEPS AT FIVE RPM. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN EXCEPTIONS EXTENDING TO 14 SWEEPS ASSUMING SAME TRACK

D. PLOTS OF REPORTED TRACKS ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH ANY KNOWN FLIGHT PROFILES OF ANY MAN MADE OBJECT NOR ARE OBSERVATIONS CONSISTENT WITH ANY PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE

E. MAJORITY OF THE REPORTED SIGHTINGS HAVE BEEN IN LOCATIONS WITHIN ROUND MOUNTAIN, WLM SURAD AND 3CRU RADAR COVERAGE. DOFA AND RAAF ATC STAFF CONFIRM THAT NO TRACKS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED BY ROUND MOUNTAIN SINCE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS WERE FIRST OBSERVED. WLM STAFF ALSO CONFIRM THEY ALSO HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SPECIFIC TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY AS UNIDENTIFIED OR ANY OTHER EVIDENCE OF UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS ON WLM RADAR. REF B INDICATED THAT ONE TRACK HAD BEEN CORROBORATED BY 3CRU. FURTHER INQUIRIES REVEAL THAT THIS RESULTED FROM A RATHER CASUAL INQUIRY FROM SYDNEY RELATING TO AN OBSERVED TRACK ABOUT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL UNIDENTIFIED SIGHTINGS. WHILE NOT DETRACTING FROM THE ACCURACY OF THE STATEMENT IT DOES RAISE EXTREME DOUBTS ON WHETHER THIS UNRECORDED INTERCHANGE COULD

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

PAGE 3 RAYROB 869 R E S T R I C T E D

B. REGARDED AS POSITIVE CORROBORATION THE LACK OF ANY FOLLOW-UP
CONFIRMATION OF TRACKS REINFORCES THIS VIEW

F. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH BUMET TO ADVISE OF ANY UNUSUAL
MET CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF OBSERVATIONS, ANAPROP BEING
ONE EXPLANATION FOR AT LEAST SOME TRACKS

G. VERBAL DISCUSSIONS WITH DOFA SENIOR ENGINEERS AND RADAR
TECHNICIANS AT MASCOT INDICATE A STRONG POSSIBILITY OF A RADAR
FAULT CAUSING THE MAJORITY OF THESE OBSERVATIONS AND APPROPRIATE
INVESTIGATION EFFORT HAS STARTED. TO DATE NO FAULT HAS BEEN
FOUND WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION AND INVESTIGATIONS ARE
CONTINUING

BT

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18
IMMEDIATE

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'83 JUL -1 -4 55

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OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 422 182040Z

ZNR UUUUU

O 010350Z JUL 83

FM HQOO

TO HQWLM

BT

UNCLAS

SIG ADA

387/COFS

FOR OC FROM COFS

SURVEILLANCE TASKING

UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE YOU ARE TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF TWO UNARMED
MIRAGE AIRCRAFT ON ALERT TWO TO ELECTRONICALLY OR VISUALLY IDENTIFY
UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY
SYDNEY RADAR. AIRCRAFT SHOULD NOT BE USED UNLESS CONFIRMATION OF
ANY REPORTED TRACKS IS FORTHCOMING FROM 3CRU, WLM SURAD OR
ANY RADAR OTHER THAN SYDNEY

BT



RAAF
COMMCEN

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'83 JUL -1 -5 27

DE RAYROB 423 1820416

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O 010402Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRCX/AVAIT NSW AA26178

RAYRWB/HQWLM

BT

UNCLAS

SIG HQO

397/SOCC

AVAIT FOR MR BOB POWELL (SSATC)

POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION OF UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS WITHIN
150 NM RADIUS OF WILLIAMTOWN

A. TELCOM WGCDCR V. MEYN/BOB POWELL.

1. TO ENABLE EFFECTIVE SCRAMBLE OF MIRAGE AIRCRAFT FROM WILLIAM-
TOWN, TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS, REQUEST ASSURANCE
THAT EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE WILL BE PROVIDED BY SYDNEY AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL, TO PERMIT UNINTERRUPTED SCRAMBLE VECTORS AS
REQUESTED BY WILLIAMTOWN.

2. THE DURATION OF THIS REQUEST IS UNKNOWN, AND APPLICATION OF
OF THIS ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED UNTIL OTHERWISE ADVISED BY HQ
WILLIAMTOWN

PAGE 2 RAYROB 423 UNCLAS

3. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE TO THIS HQ AND HQWLM

BT



RAAF
COMMCEM

831
NNNNVZCZCOHA236 HH

RESTRICTED

83 JUL -1 -5 58

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYWPA 063 1820514

ZNY RRRRR

O R 010514Z JUL 83 ZZM1

This message is a correction.
Destroy other copies.

FM DEFAIRA CANBERRA

TO RAYROB/HQOC

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYWYD/CDFS CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG HEE

AO917/DGOPS-AF

UNIDENTIFIED RADAR TRACKS - SYDNEY RADAR

A. TELECON DGOPSAF/COFS OF 30 JUN 83

B. HQOC 073/JOINT OF 300350Z JUN 83

1. THIS MESSAGE, INTER ALIA, CONFIRMS ORAL INSTRUCTIONS PASSED VIA REFERENCE A.

2. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR IN RECENT WEEKS (REF B), HQOC IS TO TAKE ACTION TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE OF THESE AND ANY FUTURE SIMILAR UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS IN THE SYDNEY REGION. THIS ACTION IS TO INCLUDE EXTENDED HOURS OF RADAR SURVEILLANCE AND VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS ARE AT DISCRETION OF AOCOC, HOWEVER THE PERIODS DURING WHICH MOST OF THE TRACKS HAVE OCCURRED ARE TO BE COVERED.

4. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED ON VISUAL IDENTIFICATION FLIGHTS ARE NOT, REPEAT, NOT TO CARRY WEAPONS.

5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO DEFAIR (DOPS-AF) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. CURRENT AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS.

B. ANY FURTHER DETECTIONS OF SIMILAR TRACKS AND DETAILS OF ANY RESPONISVE ACTION ARE TO BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY.

C. A SITREP IS TO BE FORWARDED DAILY TO COVER THE SITUATION TO 1000 HOURS LOCAL. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT/CRU STANDBY STATUS, ADVICE ON ANY PROGRESS MADE IN ESTABLISHING THE CAUSE OF THE TRACKS AND ANY HQOC RECOMMENDATIONS.

D. A FINAL REPORT WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE CONSLUSION OF THE OPERATION.

6. AT THIS STAGE IT IS PLANNED THAT AIRCRAFT STANDBY BE CONTINUED FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK. HOWEVER, THIS ASPECT WILL BE KEPT UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF ALL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS

BT

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IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

83 JUL -1 -8 :17

NNNNVZCZCOHA280

HH

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 430 1820741

ZNY RRRRR

O 010735Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYBBB/HQAMB

INFO RAYRWB/HQWLM

RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

723/AOC

FOR OCAMB, OCWLM DEFAIR FOR DGOPS

OPERATION "CLOSE ENCOUNTER"

1. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERERISTICS OF UNIDENTIFIED HIGH SPEED RADAR TRACKS REPORTED BY SYDNEY RADAR IN RECENT WEEKS, CAS HAS DIRECTED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURE OF THESE AND ANY FUTURE SIMILIAR UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS IN THE SYD AREA.

2. OCWLM HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO IDENTIFY THESE TRACKS. TO SUPPORT OCWLM AS NECESSARY YOU ARE TO DEPLOY TWO CLEAN F111S TO WLM ASAP. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THESE ASSETS IS TO REVERT TO OCWLM ON ARRIVAL WLM.

RESTRICTED

PAGE 2 RAYROB 430 R E S T R I C T E D

RESTRICTED

3. AT THIS STAGE, THESE AIRCRAFT ARE TO BE OPERATED ON AN AIRCREW TURNAROUND BASIS UNTIL TUES 5 JUL 83, WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FROM HQWLM UNITS. UP TO TWO MISSIONS PER DAY SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED. FURTHER AIRCREW/MAINTENANCE SUPPORT EX AMBERLEY MAY BE REQUIRED AFTER MON 4 JUL 83. DIRLAUTH OCWLM/OCAMB IS AUTHORIZED IN THIS REGARD.

4. SEPERATE INSTRUCTIONS/GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF F111 ASSETS IN THIS OPERATION WILL BE ISSUED TO OCWLM INFO OCAMB

BT

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

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HH

'83 JUL -1 -8 39

OO RAYRWB

DE RAYROB 431 1820803

ZNY RRRRR

O 010755Z JUL 83

FM HQOC

TO RAYRWB/HQWLM

INFO RAYBBB/HQAMB

RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

SIG ADA

724/AOC

FOR OCWLM, OCAMB DEFAIR FOR DGOPS-AF
OPERATION "CLOSE ENCOUNTER

A. HQOC 387/COFS OF 1 JUL 83

B. DEFAIR A0917/DGOPS-AF OF 1 JUL 83

1. FURTHER TO INSTRUCTIONS AT REFERENCE A AND CONSIDERING
THE REQUIREMENTS OF REFERENCE B, AIRCRAFT MAY BE SCRAMBLED,
AT YOUR DISCRETION, FOR IDENTIFICATION OF TRACKS DETECTED ONLY
BY SYDNEY RADAR.

2. AIRCRAFT AND CARU ALERT STATES ARE AT YOUR DISCRETION, HOWEVER,
YOU ARE TO ENSURE THAT TIME PERIODS DURING WHICH MOST TRACKS HAVE
OCCURRED ARE ADEQUATELY COVERED.

RESTRICTED

2 RAYROB 431 R E S T R I C T E D

RESTRICTED

3. TWO F-111 AIRCRAFT ARE BEING DEPLOYED TO WLM FOR YOUR USE DURING THIS OPERATION AND ARE PLACED UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL FROM TIME OF ARRIVAL WLM.

4. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS OPERATION THE RESTRICTIONS REGARDING SUPERSONIC FLIGHT AS DETAILED IN HQOC ASI 1/A/4 ARE WAIVED. HOWEVER, F-111 AIRCRAFT SHOULD AVOID SUPERSONIC FLIGHT OVER LAND UNLESS IT BECOMES ESSENTIAL FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IDENTIFICATION OF A TARGET.

5. ONE AIR DEFENCE CONTROLLER HAS BEEN ATTACHED FROM 3 CARU FOR DUTY MASCOT. ON HIS ARRIVAL AT MASCOT CLOSE CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT COULD BE EFFECTED, AT YOUR DISCRETION, BY EITHER 3 CARU OR SYDNEY RADAR.

6. SPECIAL AIRWAYS CLEARANCE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN AGREED WITH DOA SYDNEY AND DETAILS HAVE BEEN ADVISED SEPARATELY.

7. YOU ARE TO REPORT DIRECT TO THIS HQ COPY TO DEFAIR (DGOPS) AS REQUIRED BY PARA 5 OF REFERENCE B. DETAILS OF SCRAMBLES AND ADVICE OF ANY MULTI SENSOR CORRELATED TRACKS SHOULD BE DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY. THE DAILY SITREP SHOULD INCLUDE DETAILS OF ALL UNIDENTIFIED TRACKS REPORTED TO 3 CARU

BT

RESTRICTED

Telephone 28.7777

Headquarters
RAAF Base
WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314HQWLM 17/26/AIR
HQWLM 7/4/AIR(2)

1 July 1983

Headquarters RAAF Williamtown Operation Order No 11/83 - Exercise Close EncounterReference: A. Telecon COFS/OCWLM of approximately 300930ZJUN83Time Zone Used Throughout This Order: ZULUTask Organization: No 2 Operational Conversion Unit
No 77 Squadron
No 3 Control and Reporting Unit
No 481 Squadron
Base Squadron RAAF Williamtown

1. Situation. Headquarters RAAF Williamtown has been tasked vide Reference A to provide air defence resources for the identification of unknown radar contacts reported by Department of Aviation (D of A) air traffic control agencies in Sydney. The radar contacts, travelling at high speed, have appeared to the north of Sydney out to 150nm and have been assessed by D of A as almost certainly resulting from man-made objects.

a. Energy Forces NIL

b. Friendly Forces NIL

2. Mission. To validate the unknown radar contacts reported by D of A Sydney and to identify those contacts by radar and airborne identification.

a. Activity Period. This task remains current on a 24-hour-a-day basis until cancelled by HQOC.b. Provision of Forces.

(1) Aircraft. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine resources to provide two (2) Mirage aircraft on alert 2 plus one (1) spare Mirage for identification missions until 040200ZJUL83. Alert aircraft are to be configured with either gun-bay and wet leading edge fuel tanks or with supersonic fuel tanks.

(2) Aircrew. CO 20CU and CO 77SQN are to combine to maintain an aircrew roster for alert duties drawing on all 20CU staff pilots, all 77SQN pilots of Category C or higher and all HQWLM pilots.

(3) No 3 Control and Reporting Unit. CO 3CRU is to provide radar surveillance and intercept control for fighter aircraft until the task is cancelled.

(4) Base Squadron. COBS is to provide ATC radar surveillance and appropriate ATC facilities until the task is cancelled.

(5) Command and Control. The normal command and control chain is to apply, except that promulgated Authorizing Officers from either 77SQN or 20CU assigned to this operation may authorize flights by any qualified aircrew in any aircraft assigned specifically to this operation. This exception will pertain until the task is cancelled.


3. Execution

- a. BSWLM and 3CRU. Continuous surveillance is to be maintained by ATC and 3CRU and all radar contacts are to be identified in consultation with DoA. 3CRU is to attempt to confirm the existence of unidentified contacts reported by Sydney ATC and, if confirmed, scramble Mirage aircraft to identify the contact.
- b. Scramble Procedure. Mirage aircraft are to be scrambled directly from 3CRU via UHF.
- c. Identification Procedure. Mirage pilots are to attempt an SOP identification pass on any unidentified aircraft designated by 3CRU which appears on the Mirage's A1 radar.
- d. Intercept Safety Rules. Normal rules of safety are to apply. In particular, the provisions of HQOC ASIs 1/A/1, and Annex A to 2/B/2 are to be strictly observed.
- e. Rules of Engagement. Sorties are to be flown in accordance with Rules of Engagement as nominated by OCWLM from JSP(AS) 38 Chapter 6.
- f. Flight Limitations. All aircrew are to strictly observe the flight envelope limitations relevant to the current Mirage safety equipment fit and to the aircraft's configurations.

4. Administration and Logistics

- a. Aircraft Maintenance. BENG0 is to co-ordinate the allocation of technical manpower resources from 77SQN, 20CU and 481SQN for the provision of maintenance and turn around support for aircraft assigned to this task.
- b. 481SQN. CO 481SQN is to provide arrestor barrier support and maintain strip-recovery alert on a 24 hour-a-day basis.
- c. BSWLM. COBS is to provide the following support:
 - (1) ATC Van. The ATC Van is required for ORP maintenance support. Telephone services are to be provided to the van.
 - (2) Refuelling Tankers. 20CU is to receive refuelling priority.
 - (3) Messing. All messes are to be manned to cater for task activities. BCATO is to liaise with CO 20CU, CO 3CRU and CO 481SQN to define messing requirements.
 - (4) Central Store. Provision is to be made for units to access the central store at all times.

5. Command and Signal
- a. IFF/SIF. Routine 20CU and 3CRU callsigns are to be used.
6. Acknowledgement Instructions. Do not acknowledge.



(W.D.J. MONAGHAN)
Air Commodore
Officer Commanding

Distribution:

Copy Nos:

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